Fraud: The Free Dictionary

Fraud
The Free Dictionary
LINK

A false representation of a matter of fact—whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should have been disclosed—that deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it to her or his legal injury.

Fraud is commonly understood as dishonesty calculated for advantage. A person who is dishonest may be called a fraud. In the U.S. legal system, fraud is a specific offense with certain features.

Fraud is most common in the buying or selling of property, including real estate, Personal Property, and intangible property, such as stocks, bonds, and copyrights. State and federal statutes criminalize fraud, but not all cases rise to the level of criminality. Prosecutors have discretion in determining which cases to pursue. Victims may also seek redress in civil court.

Fraud must be proved by showing that the defendant's actions involved five separate elements: (1) a false statement of a material fact,(2) knowledge on the part of the defendant that the statement is untrue, (3) intent on the part of the defendant to deceive the alleged victim, (4) justifiable reliance by the alleged victim on the statement, and (5) injury to the alleged victim as a result.

These elements contain nuances that are not all easily proved. First, not all false statements are fraudulent. To be fraudulent, a false statement must relate to a material fact. It should also substantially affect a person's decision to enter into a contract or pursue a certain course of action. A false statement of fact that does not bear on the disputed transaction will not be considered fraudulent.

Second, the defendant must know that the statement is untrue. A statement of fact that is simply mistaken is not fraudulent. To be fraudulent, a false statement must be made with intent to deceive the victim. This is perhaps the easiest element to prove, once falsity and materiality are proved, because most material false statements are designed to mislead.

Third, the false statement must be made with the intent to deprive the victim of some legal right.

Fourth, the victim's reliance on the false statement must be reasonable. Reliance on a patently absurd false statement generally will not give rise to fraud; however, people who are especially gullible, superstitious, or ignorant or who are illiterate may recover damages for fraud if the defendant knew and took advantage of their condition.

Finally, the false statement must cause the victim some injury that leaves her or him in a worse position than she or he was in before the fraud.

A statement of belief is not a statement of fact and thus is not fraudulent. Puffing, or the expression of a glowing opinion by a seller, is likewise not fraudulent. For example, a car dealer may represent that a particular vehicle is "the finest in the lot." Although the statement may not be true, it is not a statement of fact, and a reasonable buyer would not be justified in relying on it.

The relationship between parties can make a difference in determining whether a statement is fraudulent. A misleading statement is more likely to be fraudulent when one party has superior knowledge in a transaction, and knows that the other is relying on that knowledge, than when the two parties possess equal knowledge. For example, if the seller of a car with a bad engine tells the buyer the car is in excellent running condition, a court is more likely to find fraud if the seller is an auto mechanic as opposed to a sales trainee. Misleading statements are most likely to be fraudulent where one party exploits a position of trust and confidence, or a fiduciary relationship. Fiduciary relationships include those between attorneys and clients, physicians and patients, stockbrokers and clients, and the officers and partners of a corporation and its stockholders.

A statement need not be affirmative to be fraudulent. When a person has a duty to speak, silence may be treated as a false statement. This can arise if a party who has knowledge of a fact fails to disclose it to another party who is justified in assuming its nonexistence. For example, if a real estate agent fails to disclose that a home is built on a toxic waste dump, the omission may be regarded as a fraudulent statement. Even if the agent does not know of the dump, the omission may be considered fraudulent. This is constructive fraud, and it is usually inferred when a party is a fiduciary and has a duty to know of, and disclose, particular facts.

Fraud is an independent criminal offense, but it also appears in different contexts as the means used to gain a legal advantage or accomplish a specific crime. For example, it is fraud for a person to make a false statement on a license application in order to engage in the regulated activity. A person who did so would not be convicted of fraud. Rather, fraud would simply describe the method used to break the law or regulation requiring the license.

Fraud resembles theft in that both involve some form of illegal taking, but the two should not be confused. Fraud requires an additional element of False Pretenses created to induce a victim to turn over property, services, or money. Theft, by contrast, requires only the unauthorized taking of another's property with the intent to permanently deprive the other of the property. Because fraud involves more planning than does theft, it is punished more severely.

Federal and state criminal statutes provide for the punishment of persons convicted of fraudulent activity. Interstate fraud and fraud on the federal government are singled out for federal prosecution. The most common federal fraud charges are for mail and wire fraud. Mail and wire fraud statutes criminalize the use of the mails or interstate wires to create or further a scheme to defraud (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1342).

Tax fraud against the federal government consists of the willful attempt to evade or defeat the payment of taxes due and owing (I.R.C. §7201). Depending on the defendant's intent, tax fraud results in either civil penalties or criminal punishment. Civil penalties can reach an amount equal to 75 percent of the underpayment. Criminal punishment includes fines and imprisonment. The degree of intent necessary to maintain criminal charges for tax fraud is determined on a case-by-case basis by the Internal Revenue Service and federal prosecutors.

There are other federal fraud laws. For example, the fraudulent registration of Aliens is punishable as a misdemeanor under federal law (8 U.S.C.A. § 1306). The "victim" in such a fraud is the U.S. government. Fraud violations of banking laws are also subject to federal prosecution (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 104 et seq.).

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines recommend consideration of the intended victims of fraud in the sentencing of fraud defendants. The guidelines urge an upward departure from standard sentences if the intended victims are especially vulnerable. For example, if a defendant markets an ineffective cancer cure, that scheme, if found to be fraudulent, would warrant more punishment than a scheme that targets persons generally, and coincidentally happens to injure a vulnerable person. Federal courts may require persons convicted of fraud to give notice and an explanation of the conviction to the victims of the fraud (18 U.S.C.A. § 3555).

All states maintain a general criminal statute designed to punish fraud. In Arizona, the statute is called the fraudulent scheme and artifice statute. It reads, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who, pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, knowingly obtains any benefit by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions" is guilty of a felony (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2310(A)).

States further criminalize fraud in a variety of settings, including trade and commerce, Securities, taxes, real estate, gambling, insurance, government benefits, and credit. In Hawaii, for example, fraud on a state tax return is a felony warranting a fine of up to $100,000 or three years of imprisonment, or both, and a fraudulent corporate tax return is punished with a fine of $500,000 (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 231-36). Other fraud felonies include fraud in the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance (§ 329-42) and fraud in government elections (§ 19-4). Fraud in the application for and receipt of public assistance benefits is punished according to the illegal gain: fraud in obtaining over $20,000 in food coupons is a class B felony; fraud in obtaining over $300 in food coupons is a class C felony; and all other public assistance fraud is a misdemeanor (§ 346-34). Alteration of a measurement device is fraud and is punished as a misdemeanor (§ 486-136).

In civil court, the remedy for fraud can vary. In most states, a plaintiff may recover "the benefit of the bargain." This is a measure of the difference between the represented value and the actual value of the transaction. In some states, a plaintiff may recover as actual damages only the value of the property lost in the fraudulent transaction. All states allow a plaintiff to seek Punitive Damages in addition to actual damages. This right is exercised most commonly in cases where the fraud is extremely dangerous or costly. Where the fraud is contractual, a plaintiff may choose to cancel, or rescind, the contract. A court order of Rescission returns all property and restores the parties to their precontract status.

Fraud is also penalized by administrative agencies and professional organizations that seek to regulate certain activities. Under state statutes, a professional may lose a license to work if the license was obtained with a false statement.

One particularly well publicized area of fraud is Corporate Fraud. Corporate fraud cases are largely governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCA §§ 78a et seq.), along with other rules and regulations propagated by theSecurities and Exchange Commission. These laws were a response to the market turmoil during the 1930s and well-publicized corporate fraud cases.

The Securities Exchange Act and the SEC regulate anything having to do with the trading or selling of securities and stocks. They govern fraudulent behavior ranging from stock manipulation to insider trading. They also provide for civil and criminal penalties for corporate fraud.

Despite the act and the SEC, in the early part of the twenty-first century, corporate fraud began to seem endemic. Such well-known companies as energy trader Enron, Telecommunications company WorldCom, cable provider Adelphia, and other lesser-known firms went into Bankruptcy as a result of corporate fraud. In light of these events, Congress decided to tighten up corporate fraud requirements with the passages of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (U.S. PL 107-204).

Among other features, Sarbanes-Oxley required expanded and more frequent disclosure by public companies of their finances to prevent fraud. It created a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to register and regulate accounting firms and accounting practices. It also enhanced the SEC's power to monitor and investigate compliance with securities laws, adding stiff penalties for fraudulent behavior by corporations, their officers, and their accountants.

Further readings

Clemency, John. 2002. "Corporate Fraud: Where Should the Buck Really Stop?" American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 21 (November).

Ribstein, Larry. 2002. "Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002." Journal of Corporation Law 28 (fall).

Employment Due Process PROTOCOL

American Arbitration Association

The following protocol is offered by the undersigned individuals, members of the Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, as a means of providing due process in the resolution by mediation and binding arbitration of employment disputes involving statutory rights. The signatories were designated by their respective organizations, but the protocol reflects their personal views and should not be construed as representing the policy of the designating organizations.

Genesis

This Task Force was created by individuals from diverse organizations involved in labor and employment law to examine questions of due process arising out of the use of mediation and arbitration for resolving employment disputes. In this protocol we confine ourselves to statutory disputes.

The members of the Task Force felt that mediation and arbitration of statutory disputes conducted under proper due process safeguards should be encouraged in order to provide expeditious, accessible, inexpensive and fair private enforcement of statutory employment disputes for the 100,000,000 members of the workforce who might not otherwise have ready, effective access to administrative or judicial relief. They also hope that such a system will serve to reduce the delays which now arise out of the huge backlog of cases pending before administrative agencies and courts and that it will help forestall an even greater number of such cases.

A. Pre or Post Dispute Arbitration

The Task Force recognizes the dilemma inherent in the timing of an agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate statutory disputes. It did not achieve consensus on this difficult issue. The views in this spectrum are set forth randomly, as follows:

Employers should be able to create mediation and/or arbitration systems to resolve statutory claims, but any agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate disputes should be informed, voluntary, and not a condition of initial or continued employment.

Employers should have the right to insist on an agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate statutory disputes as a condition of initial or continued employment. 

Postponing such an agreement until a dispute actually arises, when there will likely exist a stronger re-disposition to litigate, will result in very few agreements to mediate and/or arbitrate, thus negating the likelihood of effectively utilizing alternative dispute resolution and overcoming the problems of administrative and judicial delays which now plague the system. 

Employees should not be permitted to waive their right to judicial relief of statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship for any reason. 

Employers should be able to create mediation and/or arbitration systems to resolve statutory claims, but the decision to mediate and/or arbitrate individual cases should not be made until after the dispute arises. 

The Task Force takes no position on the timing of agreements to mediate and/or arbitrate statutory employment disputes, though it agrees that such agreements be knowingly made. The focus of this protocol is on standards of exemplary due process.

B. Right of Representation

1. Choice of Representative

Employees considering the use of or, in fact, utilizing mediation and/or arbitration procedures should have the right to be represented by a spokesperson of their own choosing. The mediation and arbitration procedure should so specify and should include reference to institutions which might offer assistance, such as bar associations, legal service associations, civil rights organizations, trade unions, etc.

2. Fees for Representation

The amount and method of payment for representation should be determined between the claimant and the representative. We recommend, however, a number of existing systems which provide employer reimbursement of at least a portion of the employee's attorney fees, especially for lower paid employees. The arbitrator should have the authority to provide for fee reimbursement, in whole or in part, as part of the remedy in accordance with applicable law or in the interests of justice.

3. Access to Information

One of the advantages of arbitration is that there is usually less time and money spent in pre-trial discovery. Adequate but limited pre-trial discovery is to be encouraged and employees should have access to all information reasonably relevant to mediation and/or arbitration of their claims. The employees' representative should also have reasonable pre-hearing and hearing access to all such information and documentation.

Necessary pre-hearing depositions consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration should be available. We also recommend that prior to selection of an arbitrator, each side should be provided with the names, addresses and phone numbers of the representatives of the parties in that arbitrator's six most recent cases to aid them in selection.

C. Mediator and Arbitrator Qualification

1. Roster Membership

Mediators and arbitrators selected for such cases should have skill in the conduct of hearings, knowledge of the statutory issues at stake in the dispute, and familiarity with the workplace and employment environment. The roster of available mediators and arbitrators should be established on a non-discriminatory basis, diverse by gender, ethnicity, background, experience, etc. to satisfy the parties that their interest and objectives will be respected and fully considered.

Our recommendation is for selection of impartial arbitrators and mediators. We recognize the right of employers and employees to jointly select as mediator and/or arbitrator one in whom both parties have requisite trust, even though not possessing the qualifications here recommended, as most promising to bring finality and to withstand judicial scrutiny. The existing cadre of labor and employment mediators and arbitrators, some lawyers, some not, although skilled in conducting hearings and familiar with the employment milieu is unlikely, without special training, to consistently possess knowledge of the statutory environment in which these disputes arise and of the characteristics of the non-union workplace.

There is a manifest need for mediators and arbitrators with expertise in statutory requirements in the employment field who may, without special training, lack experience in the employment area and in the conduct of arbitration hearings and mediation sessions. Reexamination of rostering eligibility by designating agencies, such as the American Arbitration Association, may permit the expedited inclusion in the pool of this most valuable source of expertise.

The roster of arbitrators and mediators should contain representatives with all such skills in order to meet the diverse needs of this caseload.

Regardless of their prior experience, mediators and arbitrators on the roster must be independent of bias toward either party. They should reject cases if they believe the procedure lacks requisite due process.

2. Training

The creation of a roster containing the foregoing qualifications dictates the development of a training program to educate existing and potential labor and employment mediators and arbitrators as to the statutes, including substantive, procedural and remedial issues to be confronted and to train experts in the statutes as to employer procedures governing the employment relationship as well as due process and fairness in the conduct and control of arbitration hearings and mediation sessions.

Training in the statutory issues should be provided by the government agencies, bar associations, academic institutions, etc., administered perhaps by the designating agency, such as the AAA, at various locations throughout the country. Such training should be updated periodically and be required of all mediators and arbitrators. Training in the conduct of mediation and arbitration could be provided by a mentoring program with experienced panelists.

Successful completion of such training would be reflected in the resume or panel cards of the arbitrators supplied to the parties for their selection process.

3. Panel Selection

Upon request of the parties, the designating agency should utilize a list procedure such as that of the AAA or select a panel composed of an odd number of mediators and arbitrators from its roster or pool. The panel cards for such individuals should be submitted to the parties for their perusal prior to alternate striking of the names on the list, resulting in the designation of the remaining mediator and/or arbitrator.

The selection process could empower the designating agency to appoint a mediator and/or arbitrator if the striking procedure is unacceptable or unsuccessful. As noted above, subject to the consent of the parties, the designating agency should provide the names of the parties and their representatives in recent cases decided by the listed arbitrators.

4. Conflicts of Interest

The mediator and arbitrator for a case has a duty to disclose any relationship which might reasonably constitute or be perceived as a conflict of interest. The designated mediator and/or arbitrator should be required to sign an oath provided by the designating agency, if any, affirming the absence of such present or preexisting ties.

5. Authority of the Arbitrator

The arbitrator should be bound by applicable agreements, statutes, regulations and rules of procedure of the designating agency, including the authority to determine the time and place of the hearing, permit reasonable discovery, issue subpoenas, decide arbitrability issues, preserve order and privacy in the hearings, rule on evidentiary matters, determine the close of the hearing and procedures for post-hearing submissions, and issue an award resolving the submitted dispute.

The arbitrator should be empowered to award whatever relief would be available in court under the law. The arbitrator should issue an opinion and award setting forth a summary of the issues, including the type(s) of dispute(s), the damages and/or other relief requested and awarded, a statement of any other issues resolved, and a statement regarding the disposition of any statutory claim(s).

6. Compensation of the Mediator and Arbitrator

Impartiality is best assured by the parties sharing the fees and expenses of the mediator and arbitrator. In cases where the economic condition of a party does not permit equal sharing, the parties should make mutually acceptable arrangements to achieve that goal if at all possible. In the absence of such agreement, the arbitrator should determine allocation of fees. The designating agency, by negotiating the parties' share of costs and collecting such fees, might be able to reduce the bias potential of disparate contributions by forwarding payment to the mediator and/or arbitrator without disclosing the parties' share therein.

D. Scope of Review

The arbitrator's award should be final and binding and the scope of review should be limited.

Dated: May 9, 1995

Signatories

Christopher A. Barreca, Co-Chair
Partner
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker
Rep., Council of Labor & Employment Section, American Bar Association

Max Zimny, Co-Chair
General Counsel, International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union Association
Rep., Council of Labor & Employment Section, American Bar Association

Arnold Zack, Co-Chair
President, Nat. Academy of Arbitrators

Carl E. VerBeek
Management Co-Chair Union Co-Chair

Partner
Varnum Riddering Schmidt & Howlett

Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment Section, ABA

Robert D. Manning

Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle, Wanger & Hiatt, P.C.
Union Co-Chair
Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment Section, ABA

Charles F. Ipavec, Arbitrator
Neutral Co-Chair
Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment Section, ABA

George H. Friedman
Senior Vice President
American Arbitration Association

Michael F. Hoellering
General Counsel
American Arbitration Association

W. Bruce Newman
Rep., Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution

Wilma Liebman
Special Assistant to the Director Federal Mediation & Conciliation

Joseph Garrison, President
National Employment Lawyers Association

Lewis Maltby
Director - Workplace Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union

NYC Department of Education Alleged "Chancellor" and the Strange Case of His So-Called "Contract"

NY State Education Law Section 2590-h says that "The office of chancellor of the city district is hereby continued. Such chancellor shall serve at the pleasure of and be employed by the mayor of the city of New York by contract. The length of such contract shall not exceed by more than two years the term of office of the mayor authorizing such contract." You will be surprised that the NYC DOE believes this so-called "contract" is not public, and is an undated letter. Who are they kidding? The Second Who Are You Kidding Award goes to Dennis Walcott, the pretend NYC Chancellor.
           

Betsy Combier

When Joel Klein was the so-called "Chancellor" of the NYC Department of Education ("DOE"), I filed a Freedom of Information request for his contract, because Education Law Section 2590-H says that:

Education

* § 2590-h. Powers and duties of chancellor. The office of chancellor of the city district is hereby continued. Such chancellor shall serve at the pleasure of and be employed by the mayor of the city of New York by contract. The length of such contract shall not exceed by more than two years the term of office of the mayor authorizing such contract. The chancellor shall receive a salary to be fixed by the mayor within the budgetary allocation therefor. He or she shall exercise all his or her powers and duties in a manner not inconsistent with the city-wide
educational policies of the city board. The chancellor shall have the following powers and duties as the superintendent of schools and chief executive officer for the city district, which the chancellor shall exercise to promote an equal educational opportunity for all students in the schools of the city district, promote fiscal and educational equity, increase student achievement and school performance and encourage local school-based innovation, including the power and duty to"....:

and then the law lists all the powers and duties of the person titled "Chancellor". Reading this, I saw that Joel needed a contract. So, I filed a request for that contract. Joel Klein never received a contract, according to the Department of Education.See "The Who Are You Kidding??" Award Goes To Joel Klein The New York City Department of Education Pretender". In my opinion, Mike Bloomberg hired Joel Klein as a front for the actions he felt necessary, namely, to violate Education Law in the area of labor and employment, namely tenure rights.

Susan Holtzman, the former Records Access person in charge at the NYC DOE Tweed building (52 Chambers Street, lower Manhattan), sent me the response that Joel had no contract, and she compensated for his not having a contract by sending me the contracts of two former NYC Chancellors, Harold Levy - who is an Attorney like Joel, and also received a waiver from New York State, but ALSO a contract - and Rudy Crew, who did not need a waiver, but did get a contract. By the way, after Ms. Holtzman sent me this news, she was re-assigned to the position as Attorney for District 75 at 400 Second Avenue. Maybe she was not supposed to tell me that Joel had no contract. See what happened with my request for the contract of Dennis Walcott, the "new" chancellor after the disaster ofCathie Black ended.

When Cathie Black was run out of town, Deputy Mayor and token African American Dennis Walcott was given a waiver by New York State Commissioner Steiner to become "Chancellor" of the NYC public school system. This was around April 2011. I made a formal request for his contract in September, 2011, which was not filled until June 27, 2013. Joe Baranello, the current NYC Records Access person, has a problem with me because I posted his Facebook page on my blog NYC Rubber Room Reporter when I saw that he made fun of people dressed as Santa Claus and Jewish people. He is a gay man, and should know better than to make fun or judge anyone, but as far as I know he was not disciplined for his comments. No one who works for the "chief" - the Chancellor - is given any reprimands, it seems. But we don't know.

Anyway, as I am now a paralegal working in the compulsory arbitration known as "3020-a", I go by the letter of the law. The Education Law states that in order for the NYC Chancellor to have the power to charge/discharge an employee, he/she/ must have a contract (Section 2590-H)

Here is my Appeal to Courtenaye Jackson-Chase of my request for Walcott's contract, pursuant to FOIL, and Ed Law 2590-H after almost 2 years of delays and DOE "Gotcha Squad" Attorney Adrienne Austin gave Arbitrator James A. Brown the "contract" in camera because, she insisted, the "contract" was not public:

Appeal of Deliberate, Arbitrary and Capricious Delay in Responding To FOIL #7990

Dear Ms. Courtenaye Jackson-Chase: June 7, 2013

I am hereby appealing the denial of access to the contract of Dennis Walcott, Which was requested in a Freedom of Information request filed by me in September 2011 and given the number F7990 by your Records Office and Mr. Joseph Baranello.

Here is my Freedom of Information request:
From: Betsy
Date: Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 12:54 AM
Subject: FOIL request "Walcott"
To: Baranello Joseph , FOIL@schools.nyc.gov
Cc: Betsy Combier
Parentadvocates.org
Betsy Combier, Editor, Reporter
betsy.combier@gmail.com
September 10, 2011

Mr. Joseph A. Baranello
Central Records Access Officer
Office of Legal Services
New York City Department of Education
52 Chambers Street
New York, NY 10007

JBaranello3@schools.nyc.gov
FOIL@schools.nyc.gov
Dear Mr. Baranello:

Under the provisions of the New York Freedom of Information Law, Article 6 of the Public Officers Law, I hereby request to inspect records or portions thereof pertaining to:

1) The entire online and hard copy personnel file of New York City Board/Department of Education employee Dennis Walcott. I request all records at all locations of the New York City Board/Department of Education, including 65 Court Street, the Department of Investigation, the Corporate Counsel, and all payments made to him from an expense account and/or paid to another employee, arbitrator, etc.

2) All references and education history listed in Dennis Walcott’s resume

3) The employment contract of Dennis Walcott with all appendices and with a complete listing of his duties and responsibilities, schedules of performance reviews, and to whom he must report for the performance review.

4) any emails letters or documentation from or to Patrick Sullivan that mention the name “Betsy Combier”.

If the records have been removed from their original locations, please cause a diligent search to be conducted of all appropriate file rooms and storage facilities. Please include the label “Walcott” in all correspondence that refers to this FOIL request.

If any record has been redacted, please identify which categories of information have been redacted, and cite the relevant statutory exemption(s).

If you have any questions relating to the specific record(s) or portion(s) being sought, please phone me.

RELEVANT ADVISORY OPINIONS

www.dos.state.ny.us/coog/ftext/f13952.htm

www.dos.state.ny.us/coog/ftext/f14287.htm

RELEVANT LOCAL LAW

Rules of the City of New York -- Title 43 -- Mayor -- §1-05(c)(3)
"If a request does not adequately describe the records sought, the records access officer shall notify the requesting party in writing that his request has been denied, stating the reasons why the request does not meet the requirements of this section and extending to the requesting party an opportunity to confer with the records access officer in order to attempt to reformulate the request in a manner that will enable the agency to identify the records sought."

As you know, the Freedom of Information Law requires that an agency respond to a request within five business days of receipt of a request. Therefore, I would appreciate a response as soon as possible and look forward to hearing from you shortly. If for any reason any portion of my request is denied, please inform me of the reasons for the denial in writing and provide the name and address of the person or body to whom an appeal should be directed.

Sincerely,


Betsy Combier


Editor, Parentadvocates.org
Editor, NYC Rubber Room Reporter
Director, Theaterkids, Inc.
President, The E-Accountability Foundation

Since September 2011 the extensions of time to complete my request #F7990 are:
October 7, 2011
December 8, 2011
January 9, 2012
February 7, 2012
April 12, 2012
May 24, 2012
January 18 2013
February 19, 2013
March 19, 2013
April 16, 2013
May 14, 2013
You can easily verify these dates by going to your colleague, Joseph Baranello, with whom you work at Tweed.

It is indeed disturbing that Ms. Adrienne Austin, Esq., an Attorney under your Supervision, would inform me and the Attorney I am working with in the case of N.K. , that the Walcott contract we requested in or Motion To Dismiss - and we stated that there was none - does indeed exist, and would be immediately given to Hearing Officer James Brown for in camerareview because we, Attorney David Barrett and myself, could not see it. Ms. Austin's email to us is below. Please make note of the fact that Ms. Austin sent us the email with the " " around the word contract, we did not write this:

From: Austin Adrienne
Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2013 10:26 AM
To: Jim Brown; David Barrett, esq.
Subject: RE:

Good Morning,

I have a copy of the Chancellor's "contract." I will provide it for an in
camera review by Mr. Brown, but I will not be turning it over as it is part
of a confidential personnel file.

Adrienne Austin | Agency Attorney
Administrative Trials Unit
NYC Department of Education
49-51 Chambers Street, Rm. 600
New York, New York 10007
T: (212) 374-6884
F: (212) 374-1229
aaustin4@schools.nyc.gov

Some time between May 16 and May 30, 2013, Ms. Austin gave Arbitrator James Brown, Esq., the "contract". On June 3, 2013, Arbitrator Brown stated in the record of the 3020-a Hearing of N. K., at which the Attorney is David Barrett, Esq., and I am the paralegal, that he, Brown, had reviewed the "contract" dated April 18, 2011 and found that Dennis Walcott was indeed able to delegate probable cause to Superintendents and Principals. His denial of the Motion To Dismiss is based upon his review of this "contract". His opinion, with the date of the "contract" as April 18 2011 was uploaded to TEACH on May 30, 2013.

As I did file a FOIL request of Joel Klein's "contract" and received two answers, which were (1) Klein never had a contract; and (2) Klein had a contract - basically a letter welcoming him to the Chancellorship. See my article, " The "Who Are You Kidding??" Award Goes To: Joel Klein, New York City Board of Education Pretender".

Susan Holtzman sent me the employment contracts of Rudy Crew and Harold Levy, both of which were submitted in our Reply to Ms. Austin's oral argument made in opposition to our Motion To Dismiss, all these documents are available on the TEACH website under the case of N.K.
Below are some of the supporting opinions of Robert Freeman, in reference to the contract being a public document:

http://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/f8582.htm

http://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/f7687.htm

http://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/f18075.html

http://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/f14257.htm

If Ms. Austin put the quotation marks around Dennis Walcott's "contract" because she believes it is not really a contract but an agreement or welcoming letter such as Mike Bloomberg sent Joel Klein, it is still discoverable:

Geneva Printing Co. and Donald C. Hadley v. South
Seneca School District, Supreme Court, Monroe County,
July 12, 1982 --
"Memorandum of Understanding" between superintendent and
principal found to be available following in camera inspection;
since the memorandum detailed direction and instructions regarding
the performance duties, it was found to constitute instructions to staff
that affect the public and a final agency determination; disclosure would
not result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, as record
was clearly relevant to the performance of official duties; cited opinion
of Committee. Current Law: §§87(2)(b), 2(g)(ii), (iii)

(copied from: http://www.dos.ny.gov/coog/caselaw_foil.html)

On the issue of stalling me from receiving the documents requested under FOIL #7990 and all the others, I will be filing a Notice of Claim against Mr. Joseph Baranello and others who are, I assume, willingly, recklessly, and arbitrarily treating me in a way that not only does not comply with the law, but is different from other members of the public and the press. I may have information that your press office has given out the April 18, 2011 letter/contract for Dennis Walcott to other people requesting the "contract", prior to today, and may have given me the "contract" to which Ms. Austin refers.

The law gives you 10 days to send me the documents, including the contract, of Dennis Walcott. My email address is betsy.combier@gmail.com. I expect to have the documents on or before June 24, 2013, as I know, from my sources, that all the documents requested are held at Tweed under your control. Please cease and desist from this disparate treatment.
Thank you for your attention and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Betsy Combier
betsy.combier@gmail.com
Editor, Parentadvocates.org
Editor, NYC Rubber Room Reporter
Editor, New York Court Corruption
Editor, National Public Voice

Ms. Austin also told Attorney Barrett and me that we had to file a Freedom of Information ("FOIL") request for the "contract" if we wanted a copy. This means that she knew the contract was, indeed, a public document. Gosh, so confusing!!!!!

On June 27, 2013, two (2) days past the 10 day deadline for responding to my appeal, DOE Attorney Jackson-Chase had the Baranello team send me Dennis Walcott's "contract" under the heading "released June 27, 2013". They did not title the letter as a "contract".

Here is is:

Contract of Dennis Walcott

Please note that there is no term for Walcott, as in end of his employment, and he did not put a date under his signature, if indeed he signed it at all. Additionally, there is no reference at all about Walcott's authority to be the employing board with powers to hire and fire employees.

What a scam.

Betsy Combier
Betsy Combier is Editor of Parentadvocates.org

Labor "Agreements" Cannot Waive Constitutional Rights

Constitutional Rights Cannot Be Waived

The issue here is: NYSUT and the UFT tell tenured members that they do not have the "right" to rely on any rule, law, or regulation which may be contained in Education Law 3020-a, only Article 21G, and the memorandum of agreements (MOA) signed by the UFT and the Department.

I started questioning this in 2005, and continue to do so. How can Constitutional rights be waived?

See the case below.

Justia.com Opinion Summary: 

Boaz began working for FedEx in 1997, under an agreement that stated: “To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against Federal Express Corporation, I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires first.” She began took on additional responsibilities, previously handled by a male employee, without corresponding compensation, 2004-2008. Boaz sued FedEx in 2009, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court held that, although the claims were timely under the statutes, they were barred by the agreement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on Supreme Court precedent prohibiting an employee from waiving rights under those laws.

PDF file

Arbitration = Alternative Dispute Resolution

Arbitration can work as an alternative to litigation in court as long as all parties have equal access and participation, and the arbitrator/Hearing Officer remains neutral. 

This is not what happened in NYC inside compulsory arbitration known as 3020-a.

Betsy Combier

Arbitration Defined

The submission of a dispute to an unbiased third person designated by the parties to the controversy, who agree in advance to comply with the award—a decision to be issued after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard.

Arbitration is a well-established and widely used means to end disputes. It is one of several kinds of Alternative Dispute Resolution, which provide parties to a controversy with a choice other than litigation. Unlike litigation, arbitration takes place out of court: the two sides select an impartial third party, known as an arbitrator; agree in advance to comply with the arbitrator's award; and then participate in a hearing at which both sides can present evidence and testimony. The arbitrator's decision is usually final, and courts rarely reexamine it.



Traditionally, labor and commerce were the two largest areas of arbitration. However, since the mid-1970s, the technique has seen great expansion. Some states have mandated arbitration for certain disputes such as auto insurance claims, and court decisions have broadened into areas such as Securities, antitrust, and even employment discrimination. International business issues are also frequently resolved using arbitration.


Arbitration in the United States dates to the eighteenth century. Courts frowned on it, though, until attitudes started to change in 1920 with the passage of the first state arbitration law, in New York. This statute served as a model for other state and federal laws, including, in 1925, the U.S. Arbitration Act, later known as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.). The FAA was intended to give arbitration equal status with litigation, and, in effect, created a body of federal law. After World War II, arbitration grew increasingly important to labor-management relations. Congress helped this growth with passage of the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.) in 1947, and over the next decade, the U.S. Supreme Court firmly cemented arbitration as the favored means for resolving labor issues, by limiting the judiciary's role. In the 1970s, arbitration began expanding into a wide range of issues that eventually included prisoners' rights, medical malpractice, and consumer rights. In 2003, all 50 states had modern arbitration statutes.



Arbitration can be voluntary or required. The traditional model is voluntary, and closely linked to contract law: parties often stipulate in contracts that they will arbitrate, rather than litigate, when disputes arise. For example, unions and employers almost always put an arbitration clause in their formal negotiations, known as collective bargaining agreements. By doing so, they agree to arbitrate any future employee grievances over wages, hours, working conditions, or job security—in essence, they agree not to sue if disagreements occur. Similarly, a purchaser and a provider of services who disagree over the result of a business deal may submit the problem to an arbitrator instead of a court. Mandatory arbitration is a more recent phenomenon. States such as Minnesota, New York, and New Jersey have enacted statutes that force disputes over automobile insurance claims into this forum. In addition, courts sometimes order disputants into arbitration.



In theory, arbitration has many advantages over litigation. Efficiency is perhaps the greatest. Proponents say arbitration is easier, cheaper, and faster. Proponents also point to the greater flexibility with which parties in arbitration can fashion the terms and rules of the process. Furthermore, although arbitrators can be lawyers, they do not need to be. They are often selected for their expertise in a particular area of business, and may be drawn from private practice or from organizations such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA), a national non-profit group founded in 1926. Significantly, arbitrators are freer than judges to make decisions, because they do not have to abide by the principle of stare decisis (the policy of courts to follow principles established by legal precedent) and do not have to give reasons to support their awards (although they are expected to adhere to the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, established in 1977 by the AAA and the American Bar Association).



These theoretical advantages do not always hold up in practice. Even when efficiency is achieved, some critics argue, the price is a lower quality of justice, and it can be made worse by the difficulty of appealing an award. The charge is frequently made that arbitration only results in "splitting the baby"—dividing awards evenly among the parties. The AAA roundly rejects this claim. Yet even arbitrators agree that as arbitration has become increasingly formal, it sometimes resembles litigation in its complexity. This may not be an inherent problem with the process as much as a result of flawed use of it. Parties may undermine arbitration by acting as lawyers do in a lawsuit: excessively demanding discovery (evidence from the other side), calling witnesses, and filing motions.


Ultimately, the decision to use arbitration cannot be made lightly. Most arbitration is considered binding: parties who agree to arbitration are bound to that agreement and also bound to satisfy any award determined by the arbitrator. Courts in most jurisdictions enforce awards. Moreover, they allow little or no option for appeal, expecting parties who arbitrate to assume the risks of the process. In addition, arbitration is subject to the legal doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel, which together strictly curtail the option of bringing suits based on issues that were or could have been raised initially.



Res judicata means that a final judgment on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or Cause of Action.Collateral estoppel means that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid judgment, that issue cannot be relitigated between the same parties in future litigation. Thus, often the end is truly in sight at the conclusion of an arbitration hearing and the granting of an award.



The FAA gives only four grounds on which a court may vacate, or overturn, an award: (1) where the award is the result of corruption, Fraud, or undue means; (2) where the arbitrators were evidently partial or corrupt; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing or hear pertinent evidence, or where their misbehavior prejudiced the rights of any party; and (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or imperfectly executed them so that a mutual, final, and definite award was not made. In the 1953 case Wilkov. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S. Ct. 182, 98 L. Ed. 168, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested, in passing, that an award may be set aside if it is in "mani-fest disregard of the law," and federal courts have sometimes followed this principle. Public policy can also be grounds for vacating, but this recourse is severely limited to well-defined policy based on legal precedent, a rule emphasized by the Supreme Court in the 1987 case United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, 484U.S. 29, 108 S. Ct. 364, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286.



The growth of arbitration is taken as a healthy sign by many legal commentators. It eases the load on a constantly overworked judicial system, while providing disputants with a relatively informal, inexpensive means to solve their problems. One major boost to arbitration came from the U.S. Supreme Court, which held in 1991 that Age Discrimination claims in employment are arbitrable (Gilmer v. Inter-state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26). Writing for the majority, Justice byron r. white concluded that arbitration is as effective as a trial for resolving employment disputes. Gilmer led several major employers to treat all employment claims through binding arbitration, sometimes as a condition of employment.



Arbitration clauses have become a standard feature of many employment contracts. This has led to conflicts concerning the applicability of these clauses when an employee seeks to sue an employer for a Civil Rights violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the civil rights act of 1991. A provision of this law addressed, for the first time, the arbitration of Title VII claims. Section 118 of the act states that the parties could, "where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law," choose to pursue alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration, to resolve their Title VII disputes. Since its enactment, the federal courts have been required to determine what this clause means in practice. For example, in the securities industry disputes arose over whether employers could require their employees to waive their right to bring a Title VII claim in court. The circuit courts of appeal have uniformly ruled that Congress did not mean to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims.



The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has contended that employment arbitration clauses do not prohibit the EEOC from filing an action against an employer for a civil rights violation. The Supreme Court agreed in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002), holding that the EEOC could seek damages on behalf of an employee. The commission could also seek injunctive relief to change a company's discriminatory methods. In so ruling, the Court resolved an issue that had divided the circuit courts of appeal.



The employee in question was fired from his job at the Waffle House after he suffered a seizure. He filed a claim with the EEOC, arguing that his rights under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) had been violated. Under this act, the EEOC has the authority to bring its own enforcement actions against employers and to seek reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory and Punitive Damages on behalf of an employee. Moreover, the ADA makes no exception for arbitration agreements, nor does it even mention arbitration. Therefore, the EEOC, which had not signed an arbitration agreement with the employer, was free to pursue its claims in court. The Court also concluded that the general policies surrounding the ADA, and the EEOC's enforcement arm, justified the pursuit by the EEOC of victim-specific relief. It stated that punitive damages "may often have a greater impact on the behavior of other employers than the threat of an injunction."



The Supreme Court also has validated the enforceability of arbitration awards relating to Collective Bargaining agreements. In Eastern Associated Coal Corporation v. United Mine Workers of American, District 17, 531 U.S. 57, 121S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (2000), the issue involved a labor arbitrator who ordered an employer to reinstate an employee who had twice tested positive for marijuana use. The employer filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking to have the arbitrator's decision vacated, arguing that the award went against a public policy against the operation of dangerous machinery by workers who test positive for drugs.



The Court unanimously agreed that the employee should be reinstated. The Court made it clear that the question was not whether the employee's drug use itself violated public policy, but whether the agreement to reinstate him did so. However, the Court also pointed out that the public policy exception is a narrow one. Based on these principles, the Court ruled that the reinstatement did not violate public policy, as the award did not condone drug use or its impact on public safety. In addition, the arbitrator placed conditions on the employee's reinstatement, which included suspension of work for three months without pay, participation in a substance abuse program, and continued random drug testing. The fact that the employee was a recidivist did not tip the balance in favor of discharge.



Further readings


Crowley, Thomas. 1994. "The Art of Arbitration Advocacy." Hawaii Bar Journal (September).


Culiner, Helen. 1994. "Practical Guidelines for Lawyers Representing Clients in Arbitration Proceedings Today." Dispute Resolution Journal (September).


Deye, James, and Lesly Britton. 1994. "Arbitration by the American Arbitration Association." North Dakota Law Review (spring).


Nolan-Haley, Jacqueline M. 2001. Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Nutshell. 2d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Wadsworth.


Ware, Stephen J. 2001. Alternative Dispute Resolution. St. Paul, Minn.: West Wadsworth.



Cross-references


Alternative Dispute Resolution.


West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.











arbitration n. a mini-trial, which may be for a lawsuit ready to go to trial, held in an attempt to avoid a court trial and conducted by a person or a panel of people who are not judges. The arbitration may be agreed to by the parties, may be required by a provision in a contract for settling disputes, or may be provided for under statute. To avoid clogged court calendars the parties often agree to have the matter determined by a panel such as one provided by the American Arbitration Association (which has a specific set of rules), a retired judge, some other respected lawyer, or some organization that provides these services. Usually contract-required arbitration may be converted into a legal judgment on petition to the court, unless some party has protested that there has been a gross injustice, collusion or fraud. Many states provide for mandatory arbitration of cases on a non-binding basis in the hope that these "mini-trials" by experienced attorneys will give the parties a clearer picture of the probable result and lead to acceptance of the arbitrator's decision. (See: arbitrator)


Copyright © 1981-2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill. All Right reserved.











arbitration noun adjudgment, adjustment, appraisal, arbitrage, arbitrium, assessment, decision, decree, determining of a controversy, finding, intercession, interjacence, intermediation, intervention, judgment, rapprochement, resolution,settlement
Associated concepts: advisory arbitration, arbiiration agreement, arbitration and award, arbitration award, arbitration clause, arbitration provision, arbitrators, binding arbitration, compulsory arbitration, grievance arbitration, innerest arbitration, proceeding to confirm arbitration award, voluntary arbitration





See also: adjudication, collective bargaining, intercession, mediation, negotiation, reconciliation


Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright © 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.








ARBITRATION, practice. A reference and submission of a matter in dispute concerning property, or of a personal wrong, to the decision of one or more persons as arbitrators.
2. They are voluntary or compulsory. The voluntary are, 1. Those made by mutual consent, in which the parties select arbitrators, and bind themselves by bond abide by their decision; these are made without any rule of court. 3 Bl. Com. 16.



3.-2. Those which are made in a cause depending in court, by a rule of court, before trial; these are arbitrators at common law, and the award is enforced by attachment. Kyd on Awards, 21.
4.-3. Those which are made by virtue of the statute, 9 & l0 Will. III., c. 15, by which it is agreed to refer a matter in dispute not then in court, to arbitrators, and agree that the submission be made a rule of court, which is enforced as if it had been made a rule of court; Kyd on Aw. 22; there are two other voluntary arbitrations which are peculiar to Pennsylvania.



5.-4. The first of these is the arbitration under the act of June 16, 1836, which provides that the parties to, any suit may consent to a rule of court for referring all matters of fact in controversy to referees, reserving all matters of law for the decision of the court, and the report of the referees shall have the effect of a special verdict, which is to be proceeded upon by the court as a special verdict, and either party may have a writ of error to the judgment entered thereupon



6.-5. Those by virtue of the act of 1806, which authorizes "any person or persons desirous of settling any dispute or controversy, by themselves, their agents or attorneys, to enter into an agreement in writing, or refer such dispute or controversy to certain persons to be by them mutually chosen; and it shall be the duty of the referees to make out an award and deliver it to the party in whose favor it shall be made, together with the written agreement entered into by the parties; and it shall be the duty of the prothonotary, on the affidavit of a subscribing witness to the agreement, that it was duly executed by the parties, to file the same in his office; and on the agreement being so filed as aforesaid, he shall enter the award on record, which shall be as available in law as an award made under a reference issued by the court, or entered on the docket by the parties."



7. Compulsory arbitrations are perhaps confined to Pennsylvania. Either party in a civil suit or action,, or his attorney, may enter at the prothonotary's office a rule of reference, wherein be shall declare his determination to have arbitrators chosen, on a day certain to be mentioned therein, not exceeding thirty days, for the trial of all matters in variance in the suit between the parties. A copy of this rule is served on the opposite party. On the day. appointed they meet at the prothonotary's, and endeavor to agree upon arbitrators; if they cannot, the prothonotary makes out a list on which are inscribed the names of a number of citizens, and the parties alternately strike each one of them from the list, beginning with the plaintiff, until there are but the number agreed upon or fixed by the prothonotary left, who are to be the arbitrators; a time of meeting is then agreed upon or appointed by the prothonotary, when the parties cannot agree, at which time the arbitrators, after being sworn or affirm and equitably to try all matters in variance submitted to them, proceed to bear and decide the case; their award is filed in the office of the prothonotary, and has the effect of a judgment, subject, however, to appeal, which may be entered at any time within twenty days after the filing of such award. Act of 16th June, 1836, Pamphl. p. 715.



8. This is somewhat similar to the arbitrations of the Romans; there the praetor selected from a list Of citizens made for the purpose, one or more persons, who were authorized to decide all suits submitted to them, and which had been brought before him; the authority which the proctor gave them conferred on them a public character and their judgments were without appeal Toull. Dr. Civ. Fr. liv. 3, t. 3, ch. 4, n. 820. See generally, Kyd on Awards; Caldwel on Arbitrations; Bac. Ab. h.t.; 1 Salk. R. 69, 70-75; 2 Saund. R. 133, n 7; 2 Sell. Pr. 241; Doct. Pl. 96; 3 Vin. Ab. 40; 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 2482.


A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By John Bouvier. Published 1856.

Appealing 3020-a decisions

I posted the article below in July 2012 after some Article 7511 appeals overturned the decisions of 3020-a Arbitrators. I am posting it also as a heads up about the story I will do very soon on the most unfair and biased Arbitrator on the UFT-DOE panel in NYC right now, in my opinion: Eleanor Elovich Glanstein. She is hired to fire.

People who receive unfair decisions in the 3020-a process should appeal these biased decisions!

Betsy Combier

The NYC Rubber Room Gotcha Squad Is Slammed By The New York State Supreme Court

Betsy Combier, Editor of Parentadvocates.org and NYC Rubber Room Reporter

Link

Arbitrator David Hyland ruled in February 2011 that a NYC Dean had to "learn her lesson" and pay $7,000 for after she left her office for several minutes and the father of the student who was being discussed as threatening to commit suicide took home a note his son had written on a napkin. Hyland punished Dean Nicole Moreno-Lieberman for not preserving a copy of the note and for her "serious negligence...impeded the investigation". NYS Supreme Court Judge Lucy Billings says this fine is "shocking to the conscience...By delegating unbounded latitude to respondents and Hearing Officers in these administrative actions, the statutory and regulatory scheme leaves their decisions subject to untrammeled discretion." From Betsy Combier: Thank you, Judge Billings!!!

From Betsy Combier, Editor of Parentadvocates.org and NYC Rubber Room Reporter, NYCourts-New York Court Corruption, NYC Public Voice and National Public Voice:
When I first started looking into the "NYC Rubber Rooms" and the teacher trials for tenured teachers, (3020-a) in 2003 after speaking with Polo Colon, teachers David Pakter, and Teddy Smith, I was stunned to see what was going on.
In my opinion, Mayor Bloomberg had made a business out of framing people.

Children and their parents were, and still are, bribed to lie about what a teacher has said or done, and the rewards are diverse, such as a higher score on a test, graduation from school, promotion to another grade level, etc, all done in secret with the administrators of the school and the Superintendents and even higher ups, Deputy Chancellors and the Chancellor himself - or herself, as in the case of Cathie Black. Putting all of this together is not difficult, as few people believe that a public servant is actually out to "get" him or her until it is too late. If a teacher knew that the child(ren) were lying, all they had to do was contact the parent(s) or tell a superior what was going on, and sooner than a blink of the eye, the teacher is shot down with charges either about some corporal punishment that he/she didnt do, or the ever-ready charge of "actual" tampering with an investigation, which was slipped into Chancellor's Regulations A-420 in June 2009 is charged against him/her. Anyone can interpret what the term "actual tampering" means. My point here is, once the train has left the station, there is no stopping it.  At least, that's what Mayor Bloomberg, the UFT, NYSUT and private Attorneys want teachers subjected to the rubberization process to believe. It just is not legally sound.

What is "Actual Tampering?" "Actual" tampering, according to Federal law, specifically 18  U.S.C. §1503: "unlawful to "influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice" and  §1512, which proscribes intimidating, threatening, or corruptly persuading, through deceptive conduct, a person in connection with an official proceeding". Under 1503, a government agent must prove that a defendant acted "corruptly" with the specific intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or due administration of justice. See United States v Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v Smith, 729 F. Supp. 1380, 1383-84 (D.D.C. 1990).
Acting "corruptly": some courts have defined this term as acting with "evil and wicked purposes" see United States v Banks, 942 F.2d 1576, 1578 (11th Cir. 1991), but at the very least to "act corruptly" under the statute, a defendant must have acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice. See United States v Moon, 718 F2d 1219, 1236 (2d Cir. 1983): United States v. Bashaw, 982 F.2d 168, 170 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v Anderson, 798 F.2d 919, 928 (7th Cir, 1986; ) United States v Rasheed, 663 F.2 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus it is not enough to prove that the defendant knew that a result of his actions might be to impede the administration of justice, if that was not his intent.
Section 1512 specifically applies to "witness tampering": a defendant was proven to have knowingly engaged in intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct, or corrupt persuasion with intent to influence, delay, or prevent testimony or cause any person to withhold objects or documents from an official proceeding. The defendant must be aware of the possibility of a proceeding and his efforts must be aimed specifically at obstructing that proceeding, whether pending or not; §1512 does not apply to defendants' innocent remarks or other acts unintended to affect the proceeding. See United States v Wilson, 565 F. Supp. 1416, 1431 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 

None of this applies to most of the specifications currently charged teachers in NYC, but the DOE Gotcha Squad spends hundreds or thousands of dollars trying to prove "actual" tampering, anyway. As I mentioned above, this is a business and everyone profits (except the Respondent).

From 2003 to 2008 there was little, if any, opposition to the false claims business run by the NYC DOE and the Office of General Counsel, headed by Theresa Europe ("the Gotcha Squad"). See also my article on the misinformation of the Bloomberg/klein/education mafia, Steven Brill for more on exactly how the Gotcha Squad works at 3020-a. Many people gave up, settled out of the 3020-a, resigned or retired. The effect of getting out early, before an arbitrator determined a punishment for your supposedly horrific misconduct or incompetency at 3020-a, was to put you in a precarious position as an ATR ("Absent Teacher Reserve") without rights or without any job at all. 

In Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach by Robert C. Bird, (University of Cincinnati Law Review, Winter, 2004, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 517) Bird writes: “Employers acting with just cause treat their employees with punctilious concern for fairness and equity. Only the most qualified employees are promoted. Office politics and arbitrary decision making do not infect the employment relationship...We hold "just cause" is a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power. We further hold a discharge for "just cause" is one which is not for any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason and which is one based on facts (1) supported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed by the employer to be true.”
The NYC panel of Arbitrators are told by the Gotcha Squad to disregard these well known rules. Alan Berg, an Arbitrator on the panel, exonerated a teacher brought to 3020-a before him, and told me that he was punished by Theresa Europe for making the decision that he did; following his determination, he was moved from the Administrative Trials Unit (ATU) to the dreaded Teacher Performance Unit or TPU. I have heard Gotcha Squad member Dennis Da Costa screaming at Arbitrator Anne Powers that she "better do what he says, "or else".She does as she is told by Dennis.

Additionally, the Department places everyone who has been charged on a blacklist which will hamper any employer from hiring you in the future. This blacklist is the notorious "Ineligible/Inquiry" List from which attorney Ed Wolf was able to remove Philomena Breenan. The Department's Office pf Personnel Investigations can take people off if they want. NYS Supreme Court Judge Alice Schlesinger ordered Ms. Europe to tell her how she, Europe, put people on the list and took the names off, in the case of Philomena Brennan v NYC DOE (Index no. 112977/09).

The rubberization process is arbitrary, malicious, and discretionary. 

First of all, the Rubber Room Gotcha Squad is a group comprised mostly of attorneys who are given the authority by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and his allies in NYC to remove tenured teachers - or non-tenured, depending on the circumstances - from their classroom duties because someone in the chain of command at the NYC Department of Education wants them to be out of the school. It's very simple, really.

Secondly, the initial targeting is followed by a strategy of threats, humiliation, fear and retaliation supported the Gotcha Squad as the group denies rights to anyone who opposes their false claims and conspiracy of harm. All anyone has to do to be a target is to ask, "Why?", or "Where's the money?" 

Thirdly, the agents or messengers of harm must be protected, and given special status, so that those people who are fearless and refuse to be squashed by the Gotcha Squad's lawless lies and then the retaliation, threats and verbal abuse used to punish anyone who remains standing after #1 and #2 above, can be denied a resolution to the "problem", which is basically that these fearless souls wont go away never to be heard from again. Thus the Gotcha Squad's subgroups such as the Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO), Special Commissioner of Investigation (SCI) and Office of Special Investigation (OSI) are given authority similar to the SS in World War II (but not military; mostly civilian attorneys or people willing to follow the orders of the Mayor, the Chancellor, and the New York Law Department). 

The UFT and NYSUT, the legal arm of the teacher's union, can and do act in the interest of the Unity caucus, and not in support of individual members. Very few members believe me when I tell them this before they are brought to 3020-a, but many believe this is true after the 3020-a is over, and the Hearing Officer has made a decision that often does not rest on any fact or law. NYSUT attorneys often do not do a good job defending the member at 3020-a because, I was told, everyone charged is presumed "guilty". In fact, the Unity brass told me over and over again that all people housed in the infamous "rubber rooms" - which today are smaller rooms with a few re-assigned DOE employees in each room in an office or school - are not supposed to talk to each other, cannot dispute an investigator, and are guilty of whatever he or she is accused of, so dont try too hard to find a way to save his or her career. I worked for the UFT from 2007 to 2010, and I was hired by Randi Weingarten. I did not agree that everyone was automatically guilty of the specifications they were given, and I looked into each case. 

The DOE and UFT, in order to stop any employee targeted for termination from getting a vacatur or dismissal of the decision of an arbitrator, changed the rules for appealing a determination made at 3020-a in 1994 and several times afterwards. The New York State Education Department Commissioner no longer was the office of jurisdiction where decisions were made to sustain or vacate the decisions made at 3020-a. After 1994 people dissatified at 3020-a had to file an Article 75 to the New York State Supreme Court instead of NYSED. To many non-Attorneys, filing anything in court is frightening. That was, I am sure, a main reason for the change.

To further hamper anyone from appealing, the statute giving a petitioner 30 days to file an Article 75 was shortened to 10 days, with another 15 to amend. NYSUT attorneys never take on a case that was lost at 3020-a, this is another problem. After a 3020-a is closed and decided, NYSUT attorneys always write the client and say, in general, sorry you did not win at 3020-a, however, we are not going to help you appeal. Goodbye.

The New York State Supreme Court is a mangled mess right now, desperately in need of a total overhaul. The judges are arrogant with their immunity from prosecution, and some judges, like Cynthia Kern now on the 6th floor at 60 Center Street, could not care less about the facts in a case. She grants dismissal of any and all petitions filed by a teacher or any other DOE employee. Her loyalty is very much in the interests of the New York Law Department and the DOE.

Sometimes good decisions do come out of the supreme court. The case of Christopher Asch is a case that won a vacatur of the decision of arbitrator David Hyland. Asch signed his petition as "pro se". NYS Supreme Court Judge Manuel Mendez overturned the 6-month suspension, gave Chris his backpay, and ordered the reimbursement of the money spent on a psychiatrist.

Recently David Hyland was again overturned, this time by NYS Supreme Court Judge Lucy Billings in the case of Nicole Moreno-Lieberman. Arbitrator Hyland ruled in February 2011 that a NYC Dean, Moreno-Lieberman, had to "learn her lesson" and pay $7,000 for after she left her office for several minutes and the father of the student who was being discussed as threatening to commit suicide took home a note his son had written on a napkin. Hyland punished Dean Nicole Moreno-Lieberman for not preserving a copy of the note and for her "serious negligence...impeded the investigation". NYS Supreme Court Judge Luck Billings says this fine is "shocking to the conscience...By delegating unbounded latitude to respondents and Hearing Officers in these administrative actions, the statutory and regulatory scheme leaves their decisions subject to untrammeled discretion."

Kudos to Judge Billings, who seems to see that the 3020-a arbitrators in New York City need a reality check, and not just a check from the Gotcha Squad for throwing a case. 

COMMENT from Attorney Joy Hochstadt (I do not work with, nor do I recommend Ms. Hochstadt for any 3020-a):

 

"Its just the beginning, thousands of teachers are harassed and resign before they are brought up on charges. I was told that if I resigned before the charges were presented to me (four months after I was told I was under"investigation"), then I would leave with a clean record--Klaus Bornemann forgot to tell me I'd be on the I/I list forever unless I fought it in Court. I was naive, I believed the arbitrators would not debase themselves and be biased. 

 

Then my NYSUT Attorney told me my arbitrator fired everyone; in fact the UFT had voted her off the panel, ten years ago, but the DOE offered the UFT an extra seat on the collective bargaining committee for as long as the UFT allowed Eleanor Glanstein to remain on the 3020-a permanent arbitrator panel. And so I was fired for being assigned by my Principal self-contained special ed classes for my entire program for an entire year when I have no license or background in dealing with special ed; most of the classes had students diagnosed as Emotionally Disturbed. Then they stipulated to my exemplary subject matter skills but said I was incompetent in classroom management, the administration had seen a student walk out without a pass to get a drink at a water fountain 1 foot from the classroom door. another called out his answer in class during an observation, the "do now" was 7 minutes for a class of students who find it difficult to focus and are distractable--it should be no more than 5 minutes, etc. What a waste when I was the best prepared biology teacher that ever worked for the DOE. Therefore, the Principal would rather put me in a position where she could find B.S. fault with me than to allow the advanced and capable students benefit with what I could imbue then with. The DOE attorney at the 3020-a said the assignment to special ed classes should not be mitigating because I would have had to grieve it and win (and my chapter leader told me it was too late in the term to change every teacher's program--but I grieved it before school started--the Principal elected not to hear it for 7 weeks!) Funny part I offered to help--I wrote a comprehensive plan of incentives to get out students to strive to achieve starting with color coded IDs which would let everyone know what grade placement the student had earned sufficient credits for along outings, Broadway shows, meals in Restaurants, to students of the "month" (a short enough time that students could show improvement--and there would be two cohorts --for best grades and for most improvement. Principal was so threatened she tried to put a letter in my file for distributing my proposal without her consent --UFT chapter leaders consent was all that was necessary, by precedent. 

 

Principal lost her school, DOE settled my lawsuit in my favor, and now all the other similarly situated teachers ask for my help --- but it takes the rare judge not to go along with the "program." What observers fail to understand is the scale at which this is being done. I try as best as I can to get the number of teachers given "U" ratings over the last 15 years, the number removed from regular assigments, the number unlawfully brought up on charges by their Principals who are afraid of losing their own jobs--the great old Principal with grandfathered tenure --do not do this --their schools are happy places to works at and have been for decades--it says more about the Principals than the teachers when one Principal sends 9 teachers to the rubber room in 2005-2006 and is voted Principal of the Year for 2006-2007--the Bloomberg Administration is rewarding the Principals for ousting tenured, high paid, and long-service teachers to save billions of $$$$$ by replacing them with cheap inexperienced, teachers who will never earn tenure, will never get vested in a pension plan that the city does not want to honor. Tier I teachers, almost a relic of the past if they worked from 22-62 retired a 100% final years salary plus no FICA, no Medicare tax, no state or city income tax ergo a pension payout equivalent to 125% prior take home. Tier I who worked from 22-42 and then did something else, as long as they had their QPP in Variable A, 13 years later at age 55 would retire at greater than 100% of what their final years pay was when they left--and only now is the life expectancy for teachers (no hard labor, nor dangerous assignments and adequate medical care covered by the employer) 30-40 years after they begin to get the payout. Its to avoid that cost that there is an overwhelming pressure to lock in the pensions where they are rather than accrue an additional liability of ~$80,000.00 in lifetime payout for each year the teacher continues to teach beyond this year for teachers with 20 or more years in the system and $72,000.00/year for each year the teacher teaches until 20 years of service. So economics demand they get out all tier1-2 immediately if not before, that they get out tier 3-4 teachers ASAP and that only tier V teachers where the teacher pays most to the accummulation remain so the city does not go bankrupt. More important so that Bloomberg and his other billionaired friends do not foot the bill. 

 

When confronted with these facts. they answer that they are improving the schools as well--but they are not--its Rumplestiltskin without the elf! The "bottom line" Principals do not know how to achieve higher test scores, so they blame the teachers who know that they can't do it, keep the submissive new and cheap teachers so at least they get kudos for savings. They scrub the scores and get big bonuses for student achievement, (they even embezzle to milk the system as their days are always numbered). And Bloomberg in behalf of himself and his friends have ended tenure, drastically reduced future pension obligations, lowered average salaries--and enriched the union because if there are 70,000 teachers earning S50,000.00 per year instead of 50,000 teachers earning $70,000/year then the UFT earns an additional $22,000,000.00 in union dues so it goes along. 

 

Betsy and I should write a book "Why the DOE does not care that Tyrone does not want to learn to read" --Mayoral control of the schools for reform was for the purpose of saving massive amounts of money. whether or not the students benefited, or even whether the students got less--Because just as the teachers assumed to be guilty or incompetent before the fact--it is worse that the students going to the public schools of NYC are presumed to not be amenable to getting an education, in any event--so at least we should save the money--and not all go bust in the process. 

 

It is a social Darwinism approach that the best teachers and the best students will outmaneuver the system and benefit from it. They'll even give me as an example, that I came to Randi's and her counsel's attention as someone wrongly removed and UFT hired NYSUT attorneys to prosecute a case in my behalf which the NYC Law Department settled almost immediately. They told me there was at least one case that did as well if not better. Demonstrable provable sexual harassment by a superior administrator against a DOE subordinate employee, usually can do well. But wrongful 3020-a charges do not--I was very lucky. A group of us need to go to the legislature and get hearings, because the problems that are seeking a solution need the legislature to intervene. The false accusations, defamation, loss of profession, mental anguish, blackballing I/I list--is simply criminal and intentionally so. Every prosecutor in the ATU and TPU must understand that they all are committing prosecutorial misconduct. It is as bad as prosecutors sending defendants they know to to be innocent to life sentences just so they can add to their conviction rate! Please contact me to volunteer to work on a legislative initiative both to clue in the legislature as to what is going on, and to write and lobby new legislation for NYC that will restore integrity to a corrupt and misused disciplinary process."

Joy Hochstadt, Ph.D., J.D.