Betsy Combier on Teacher Due Process Rights Given By the Bloomberg Administration (none)

Michael Bloomberg and Michael Cardozo

 From Betsy Combier:

First, I am not an attorney, just a writer/journalist. I, like most people, have opinions. Below are a few of them.

The New York City Department of Education as set up by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and his sidekick New York City Law Department Corporation Counsel Michael Cardozo, (see below for a 2009 rebuke from the NY Appellate Court Judges) are breaking the law. Specifically, New York State Education Law Section 3020-a. Lawyers who work for The Gotcha Squad and prosecute tenured teachers brought up on bogus charges of misconduct and/or incompetency know this, so do NYSUT Attorneys, and attack anyone who notices their lawless procedures in bringing "Just Cause for Termination" to all cases of 3020-a arbitration. 

Both NYSUT and the DOE Attorneys are contracted to "prosecute" teachers under the presumption that all individuals brought to 3020-a are guilty of the charges. Other presumptions that effect all cases are: the case must look at ONLY the specifications, and nothing else (i.e., the principal is breaking the law with special needs children, stole money, has skeletons in his/her closet, the person making the charge is not in the school, didnt see what happened, wasnt there...). Obviously, anyone who says that ALL facts must be brought in to the hearing to give motive and prove innocence is someone who must be tarred and feathered. That's me and the lawyers I work with, but  we do not care about this fluff and stuff, and all of that leads to a stronger case in court for any kind of appeal against the arbitrator.

For instance, on April 19, 2013, I walked by a hearing room with the door open, at 49-51 Chambers Street, and I heard NYSUT Attorney Maria Elena Gonzalez Lichten telling Arbitrator Stephen O'Beirne how "she" put my email on her blog, and...". You dont think that the Attorneys speak to arbitrators only about the cases they are doing before them, do you? Anyway, I am posting the stuff I have already placed on this blog about Maria Elena Gonzolez Lichten, wife of Stuart Lichten, to update Mr. O'Beirne on what I have written, see here, here, and here. Mr. O'Beirne is an excellent Arbitrator, in my opinion, and can see through this infantile approach to squashing opposition to the Plan ("terminate any DOE employee who has tenure and is brought to 3020-a") . By the way, Mrs. Lichten, when you said in your email that I lied, I am still waiting to hear about what, so that I may address whatever it is that I lied about? My email address is betsy.combier@gmail.com, as you know.

Now to the charging process and determination of probable cause. If you are handed your specifications with a cover letter that says "...Principal __________ has found probable cause on the charges preferred against you" tell your attorney to ask, on the record and to the arbitrator, how the principal can find probable cause against you, considering the fact that Education Law 3020-a states that the school board must go into Executive Session and vote on whether there is probable cause, bring in Appendix A, usually served with the specifications - if you dont get this document, print out Education Law 3020-a and bring in those pages. (New York State Education Law 3020-a(2)(a)). New York City is part of New York State, and as far as I know, no agreement which conflicts with the law is valid.

The April 15, 2010 so-called 'agreement' signed by Joel Klein and Mike Mulgrew cannot be legally binding because Joel Klein signed the 'agreement' as chancellor, and he was never legally chancellor because he never had a contract, required by Education Law Section 2590-h. I wrote the "Who Are You Kidding Award Goes To Joel Klein" in 2007, but Mike Bloomberg never gave out any contracts to Klein, Black or Walcott. On January 7, 2013, Arbitrator Roy Watanabe asked DOE Attorney Lisa McFadden if Walcott had a contract. She said yes, and brought into the 3020-a hearing the waiver given to Walcott by New York State Commissioner David Steiner, giving Walcott permission to be chancellor:

Waiver from Steiner To Dennis Walcott

I am not a lawyer, but I believe that as Mr. Walcott did not sign this document, there is no term of office, and for many other reasons, this is not a contract, howevermuch the Gotcha Squad says it is. Compare with the contracts of Harold Levy and Rudy Crew in my 2007 article "The Who Are You Kidding Award Goes To Joel Klein"

I noticed what they were doing eight years ago. For 5 years I remained a silent observer, writing notes on everyone from a corner by the wall as a member of the public. Then someone at the DOE made up that I taped during a hearing, and this was completely false, but I became the omen of doom when the Attorneys realized that I knew what the fraud was. NYSUT Attorney Shawn T. Kelly, for example, on May 25, 2011 while everyone at 49-51 Chambers Street was on the sidewalk due to a firedrill, screamed "Dont talk with Betsy Combier, you will be terminated..." and other nonsense.

Then there are the screamers and naysayers from the DOE, Ian Nikol, Nancy Ryan, Dennis Da Costa, and Mallory Sullivan, all Department Attorneys who would rather scream  at me and try to get me run over by a bus than address the fact that they are harming innocent people without just or probable cause.

EDUCATION LAW §3020-A MANDATES A VOTE ON SPECIFICITY BY A SCHOOL BOARD

Education Law requires a vote by the school board precede a determination of “probable cause” upon which to bring charges against teachers removed from their schools. (Education Law §3020-a, Article 61) This provides all pedagogues protection from vindictive Principals who may want to remove senior teachers from their positions because they make salaries that could pay for two teachers instead of one.

NYS Education Law §2590-g does not address the issue of review and scrutiny of whether there is probable cause to proceed with the prosecution of disciplinary charges against tenured educational personnel. The requirements of NYS Education Law §3020-a and §3020-a (2)(a) , under which tenured personnel may be disciplined for “Just Cause”, are absolute and require that before charges can be brought against a tenured educator, the School Board must:

a. Determine that there is “probable cause” for the proceeding with charges by a majority vote by the Board.
b. Make this determination within 5 days of the charges being filed with the Board.
c. Ensure that the decision to proceed with the charges is not frivolous, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.

Without a school board to perform these functions – and, the New York City Panel For Educational Policy (“PEP”) never has taken on this function – there is no oversight by anyone other than the tenured teacher’s Principal to initiate the disciplinary process and Local Superintendent to endorse the Principal’s request to prefer file charges against any educator a Principal chooses to remove from the school the Principal administers.

The lack of independent review and lack of oversight by anyone other than the tenured teacher’s Principal to initiate discipline is not consistent with Education Law §3020-a. This constitutes a de facto denial of equal protection of the §3020-a law, as all arbitrators who sit on the panel to hear 3020-a charges are not permitted by law, collective bargaining agreement, or any other contractual arrangement to make a decision on charges unless they have been voted on by the New York City Board of Education before a tenured teacher is given these charges, pursuant to Education Law §§ 2590-j, 3020, and 3020-a.

The relevant parts are as follows:
“Filing of charges. All charges against a person enjoying the benefits of tenure as provided in subdivision three of section one thousand one hundred two, and sections two thousand five hundred nine, two thousand five hundred seventy-three, twenty-five hundred ninety-j, three thousand twelve and three thousand fourteen of this chapter shall be in writing and filed with the clerk or secretary of the school district or employing board during the period between the actual opening and closing of the school year for which the employed is normally required.”

Section 3020a(2)(a) of The NY Education Law states:

“Disposition of charges. Upon receipt of the charges, the clerk or secretary of the school district or employing board shall immediately notify said board thereof. Within five days after receipt of charges, the employing board, in executive session, shall determine, by a vote of a majority of all the members of such board, whether probable cause exists to bring a disciplinary proceeding against an employee pursuant to this section. If such determination is affirmative, a written statement specifying the charges in detail, the maximum penalty which will be imposed by the board if the employee does not request a hearing or that will be sought by the board if the employee is found guilty of the charges after a hearing and outlining the employee’s rights under this section, shall be immediately forwarded to the accused employee by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested or by personal delivery to the employee.”

Furthermore, Section 2590(j)(7)(b) of The NY Education Law specifically states:

“Charges may be initiated by the community superintendent against any such employee.” There is no mention of a principal finding probable cause. Certainly it is unreasonable to believe that due process exists when a principal charges a teacher without any accountability to anyone for that decision, and then finds probable cause for charging the teacher. Therefore the Just Cause Standard is not reached, and no hearing can proceed.

Before a tenured teacher can be brought up on disciplinary charges, the Education Law lays out a number of procedural hurdles that a Board of Education must comply with. These procedural hurdles are in place to protect the rights of the tenured teacher to fair process, and constitute jurisdictional pre-requisites to a §3020-a disciplinary hearing. Chief among these procedural hurdles is the requirement that probable cause to prefer charges must be voted on by the Board of Education (see, e.g., Education Law §3020-a(2)(a)).

Compliance with this provision is a jurisdictional condition precedent to a §3020-a disciplinary hearing. Without it, the hearing cannot go forward. Prohibition is the appropriate procedural remedy for the assertion of a claim where prohibition is available “to prevent a body or officer from proceeding or threatening to proceed without or in excess of its jurisdiction.” See: Matter of Schumer v Holtzman, 60 N.Y. 2d 46, 51; Garzilli v Mills, 250 A.D.2d 131 (3d Dep’t 1998); Community School Board No. 29, SED No. 3562 (Howard Edelman, a member of the UFT-DOE arbitration panel in New York City -Dec. 14, 1998).

In New York City, §3020-a teacher disciplinary proceedings have become penal in nature and not arbitral in the same manner labor grievances are resolved. Matter of Clayton v Bd. of Educ., 49 A.D.2d 343 (3rd Dept 1975). Submission to these disciplinary hearings are compulsory and the jurisdiction of the hearing officer is derived from statute. Teachers are charged, similar to an indictment in the criminal world, upon determination of probable cause.

When I started examining the procedures used by the newly instituted Department of Education, I saw that my knowledge of education law and arbitration, which I got by reading my own books (I am not an attorney) did not give me any clue as to the random and arbitrary nature of the 3020-a hearings I was asked to attend in NYC. So, I studied the lawyers and the arbitrators to try to find out how the law could be ignored. Then the Gotcha Squad realized that I was on to something, and took it upon themselves to attack me.

So now I can write about the lawyers who decided to attack, and will provide my website with the names of the Attorneys who threw aside the lives, careers, health benefits and tenured positions of teachers in order to make a profit.

NY Appellate Bench Rips Cardozo in Law Journal Letter

LINK
In a stunning rebuke to NYC’s top lawyer, Michael Cardozo, 18 of the 20 justices that sit in the Appellate Division, First Department have taken him to the woodshed with a letter in the New York Law Journal coming out tomorrow (12/17/09). The response comes due to Cardozo’s attack on the state’s judiciary last week. Cardozo is now starting his third term as the city’s Corporation Counsel.
The appellate court judges are responding to Cardozo’s December 7th column on improving efficiency in the courts, a subject I wrote about a few days ago when both bench and bar came down on him hard in NYC’s Top Lawyer Gets Reamed For Inefficiency (By Both Bench and Bar).
But now it is not simply one panel of judges ripping the city for its own inefficiency, or lawyers writing letters to the paper. Now the vast majority of the appellate bench that hears NYC cases has called Carozo’s “imperious outpouring of advice” “insulting.” They went on to write, led by Presiding Justice Luis Gonzalez (pictured), that:

“We feel compelled to respond to his misguided assertions, his misplaced blame and his attacks on the state trial judges…”

The First Department hears cases from the Manhattan and Bronx courts. And the Second Department, which sanctioned the city just last week in Byam v. City of New York for a decade of delay in providing discovery, handles Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island (as well as other downstate counties).
You could almost see the smoke pouring off the keyboards of the judges as they wrote of Cardozo regarding changes in the use of 60-day reports that judges make to track cases:

In large measure, his facile proposals amount to an echo of reforms that are under way or have already been adopted by our former and current chief judges… Every one of these items has already been implemented by the Office of Court Administration, which on a constant basis compiles and circulates large amounts of information regarding judges’ job performance.

The idea that current reports are being inaccurate implied, to the court, that some dishonesty was going on. The letter stated:

The idea that complaints must be filed with the Judicial Conduct Commission in order to ensure accuracy in 60-day reporting requirements baselessly implies that there is actually a problem with inaccuracy, an implication for which Mr. Cardozo provides no support.

After defending the trial judges against Cardozo’s charges, the appellate judges lowered the hammer on him, placing the blame for much delay and inefficiency squarely at his feet (just as this letter Helene Blank and Marc Dittenhoefer did the other day):

In fact, it is ironic that the Corporation Counsel blames the courts for a failure to deal appropriately with litigation delays, since it is the office of Corporation Counsel of the City of New York that plays a significant role in causing those undue delays. For one thing, there is always a backlog of ready city cases in the dedicated city parts, and, with each part being assigned only two city attorneys, neither plaintiffs’ attorneys nor the trial judges have the means to ensure that ready cases can proceed immediately to trial; the city alone wields that authority. A vast amount of inefficiency impeding the resolution of litigation is also created by the city’s oft-demonstrated cavalier attitude toward its discovery obligations. The city’s almost routine failure to timely and fully cooperate with its discovery obligations, even in the face of repeated court orders, is regularly confronted by city part judges attempting to solve the city’s intransigence (see e.g., Lewis v. City of New York, 17 Misc. 3d 559 [2007]).

What followed then was a litany of First Department cases in which the sanction of attorneys fees was imposed on the city as a result of its “inexcusably lax” responses to discovery orders.
And then a concession about city cases that all the personal injury attorneys in this town already knew, but had always been simply implied by the courts:

[A]s a rule, our courts give far more leeway to the city than we typically do to other defendants in civil actions.

Cardozo isn’t having a very good holiday season. In fact, having so many judges angry at him, I’m thinking this will be his last holiday season in his office.
It’s worth noting, however, that in an interview with the Law Journal that accompanied the letter (can’t find link), Justice Gonzalez said the First Department’s “track record of evenhandedness in our treatment of Mr. Cardozo’s client, New York City,” would continue despite the judges’ criticism. He went on to say, “The bottom line is our judges are always mindful of our ethical responsibilities and our members have always dealt with Mr. Cardozo’s client in a fair and even-handed manner and we will continue to do so.”
The Corporation Counsel has 650 attorneys working for it, and handles a wide range of legal issues on behalf of the city. Background here on Cardozo as he prepared to start his third term. 

Employment Due Process PROTOCOL

American Arbitration Association

The following protocol is offered by the undersigned individuals, members of the Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, as a means of providing due process in the resolution by mediation and binding arbitration of employment disputes involving statutory rights. The signatories were designated by their respective organizations, but the protocol reflects their personal views and should not be construed as representing the policy of the designating organizations.

Genesis

This Task Force was created by individuals from diverse organizations involved in labor and employment law to examine questions of due process arising out of the use of mediation and arbitration for resolving employment disputes. In this protocol we confine ourselves to statutory disputes.

The members of the Task Force felt that mediation and arbitration of statutory disputes conducted under proper due process safeguards should be encouraged in order to provide expeditious, accessible, inexpensive and fair private enforcement of statutory employment disputes for the 100,000,000 members of the workforce who might not otherwise have ready, effective access to administrative or judicial relief. They also hope that such a system will serve to reduce the delays which now arise out of the huge backlog of cases pending before administrative agencies and courts and that it will help forestall an even greater number of such cases.

A. Pre or Post Dispute Arbitration

The Task Force recognizes the dilemma inherent in the timing of an agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate statutory disputes. It did not achieve consensus on this difficult issue. The views in this spectrum are set forth randomly, as follows:

Employers should be able to create mediation and/or arbitration systems to resolve statutory claims, but any agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate disputes should be informed, voluntary, and not a condition of initial or continued employment.

Employers should have the right to insist on an agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate statutory disputes as a condition of initial or continued employment. 

Postponing such an agreement until a dispute actually arises, when there will likely exist a stronger re-disposition to litigate, will result in very few agreements to mediate and/or arbitrate, thus negating the likelihood of effectively utilizing alternative dispute resolution and overcoming the problems of administrative and judicial delays which now plague the system. 

Employees should not be permitted to waive their right to judicial relief of statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship for any reason. 

Employers should be able to create mediation and/or arbitration systems to resolve statutory claims, but the decision to mediate and/or arbitrate individual cases should not be made until after the dispute arises. 

The Task Force takes no position on the timing of agreements to mediate and/or arbitrate statutory employment disputes, though it agrees that such agreements be knowingly made. The focus of this protocol is on standards of exemplary due process.

B. Right of Representation

1. Choice of Representative

Employees considering the use of or, in fact, utilizing mediation and/or arbitration procedures should have the right to be represented by a spokesperson of their own choosing. The mediation and arbitration procedure should so specify and should include reference to institutions which might offer assistance, such as bar associations, legal service associations, civil rights organizations, trade unions, etc.

2. Fees for Representation

The amount and method of payment for representation should be determined between the claimant and the representative. We recommend, however, a number of existing systems which provide employer reimbursement of at least a portion of the employee's attorney fees, especially for lower paid employees. The arbitrator should have the authority to provide for fee reimbursement, in whole or in part, as part of the remedy in accordance with applicable law or in the interests of justice.

3. Access to Information

One of the advantages of arbitration is that there is usually less time and money spent in pre-trial discovery. Adequate but limited pre-trial discovery is to be encouraged and employees should have access to all information reasonably relevant to mediation and/or arbitration of their claims. The employees' representative should also have reasonable pre-hearing and hearing access to all such information and documentation.

Necessary pre-hearing depositions consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration should be available. We also recommend that prior to selection of an arbitrator, each side should be provided with the names, addresses and phone numbers of the representatives of the parties in that arbitrator's six most recent cases to aid them in selection.

C. Mediator and Arbitrator Qualification

1. Roster Membership

Mediators and arbitrators selected for such cases should have skill in the conduct of hearings, knowledge of the statutory issues at stake in the dispute, and familiarity with the workplace and employment environment. The roster of available mediators and arbitrators should be established on a non-discriminatory basis, diverse by gender, ethnicity, background, experience, etc. to satisfy the parties that their interest and objectives will be respected and fully considered.

Our recommendation is for selection of impartial arbitrators and mediators. We recognize the right of employers and employees to jointly select as mediator and/or arbitrator one in whom both parties have requisite trust, even though not possessing the qualifications here recommended, as most promising to bring finality and to withstand judicial scrutiny. The existing cadre of labor and employment mediators and arbitrators, some lawyers, some not, although skilled in conducting hearings and familiar with the employment milieu is unlikely, without special training, to consistently possess knowledge of the statutory environment in which these disputes arise and of the characteristics of the non-union workplace.

There is a manifest need for mediators and arbitrators with expertise in statutory requirements in the employment field who may, without special training, lack experience in the employment area and in the conduct of arbitration hearings and mediation sessions. Reexamination of rostering eligibility by designating agencies, such as the American Arbitration Association, may permit the expedited inclusion in the pool of this most valuable source of expertise.

The roster of arbitrators and mediators should contain representatives with all such skills in order to meet the diverse needs of this caseload.

Regardless of their prior experience, mediators and arbitrators on the roster must be independent of bias toward either party. They should reject cases if they believe the procedure lacks requisite due process.

2. Training

The creation of a roster containing the foregoing qualifications dictates the development of a training program to educate existing and potential labor and employment mediators and arbitrators as to the statutes, including substantive, procedural and remedial issues to be confronted and to train experts in the statutes as to employer procedures governing the employment relationship as well as due process and fairness in the conduct and control of arbitration hearings and mediation sessions.

Training in the statutory issues should be provided by the government agencies, bar associations, academic institutions, etc., administered perhaps by the designating agency, such as the AAA, at various locations throughout the country. Such training should be updated periodically and be required of all mediators and arbitrators. Training in the conduct of mediation and arbitration could be provided by a mentoring program with experienced panelists.

Successful completion of such training would be reflected in the resume or panel cards of the arbitrators supplied to the parties for their selection process.

3. Panel Selection

Upon request of the parties, the designating agency should utilize a list procedure such as that of the AAA or select a panel composed of an odd number of mediators and arbitrators from its roster or pool. The panel cards for such individuals should be submitted to the parties for their perusal prior to alternate striking of the names on the list, resulting in the designation of the remaining mediator and/or arbitrator.

The selection process could empower the designating agency to appoint a mediator and/or arbitrator if the striking procedure is unacceptable or unsuccessful. As noted above, subject to the consent of the parties, the designating agency should provide the names of the parties and their representatives in recent cases decided by the listed arbitrators.

4. Conflicts of Interest

The mediator and arbitrator for a case has a duty to disclose any relationship which might reasonably constitute or be perceived as a conflict of interest. The designated mediator and/or arbitrator should be required to sign an oath provided by the designating agency, if any, affirming the absence of such present or preexisting ties.

5. Authority of the Arbitrator

The arbitrator should be bound by applicable agreements, statutes, regulations and rules of procedure of the designating agency, including the authority to determine the time and place of the hearing, permit reasonable discovery, issue subpoenas, decide arbitrability issues, preserve order and privacy in the hearings, rule on evidentiary matters, determine the close of the hearing and procedures for post-hearing submissions, and issue an award resolving the submitted dispute.

The arbitrator should be empowered to award whatever relief would be available in court under the law. The arbitrator should issue an opinion and award setting forth a summary of the issues, including the type(s) of dispute(s), the damages and/or other relief requested and awarded, a statement of any other issues resolved, and a statement regarding the disposition of any statutory claim(s).

6. Compensation of the Mediator and Arbitrator

Impartiality is best assured by the parties sharing the fees and expenses of the mediator and arbitrator. In cases where the economic condition of a party does not permit equal sharing, the parties should make mutually acceptable arrangements to achieve that goal if at all possible. In the absence of such agreement, the arbitrator should determine allocation of fees. The designating agency, by negotiating the parties' share of costs and collecting such fees, might be able to reduce the bias potential of disparate contributions by forwarding payment to the mediator and/or arbitrator without disclosing the parties' share therein.

D. Scope of Review

The arbitrator's award should be final and binding and the scope of review should be limited.

Dated: May 9, 1995

Signatories

Christopher A. Barreca, Co-Chair
Partner
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker
Rep., Council of Labor & Employment Section, American Bar Association

Max Zimny, Co-Chair
General Counsel, International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union Association
Rep., Council of Labor & Employment Section, American Bar Association

Arnold Zack, Co-Chair
President, Nat. Academy of Arbitrators

Carl E. VerBeek
Management Co-Chair Union Co-Chair

Partner
Varnum Riddering Schmidt & Howlett

Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment Section, ABA

Robert D. Manning

Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle, Wanger & Hiatt, P.C.
Union Co-Chair
Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment Section, ABA

Charles F. Ipavec, Arbitrator
Neutral Co-Chair
Arbitration Committee of Labor & Employment Section, ABA

George H. Friedman
Senior Vice President
American Arbitration Association

Michael F. Hoellering
General Counsel
American Arbitration Association

W. Bruce Newman
Rep., Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution

Wilma Liebman
Special Assistant to the Director Federal Mediation & Conciliation

Joseph Garrison, President
National Employment Lawyers Association

Lewis Maltby
Director - Workplace Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union