Betsy Combier on Teacher Due Process Rights Given By the Bloomberg Administration (none)

Michael Bloomberg and Michael Cardozo

 From Betsy Combier:

First, I am not an attorney, just a writer/journalist. I, like most people, have opinions. Below are a few of them.

The New York City Department of Education as set up by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and his sidekick New York City Law Department Corporation Counsel Michael Cardozo, (see below for a 2009 rebuke from the NY Appellate Court Judges) are breaking the law. Specifically, New York State Education Law Section 3020-a. Lawyers who work for The Gotcha Squad and prosecute tenured teachers brought up on bogus charges of misconduct and/or incompetency know this, so do NYSUT Attorneys, and attack anyone who notices their lawless procedures in bringing "Just Cause for Termination" to all cases of 3020-a arbitration. 

Both NYSUT and the DOE Attorneys are contracted to "prosecute" teachers under the presumption that all individuals brought to 3020-a are guilty of the charges. Other presumptions that effect all cases are: the case must look at ONLY the specifications, and nothing else (i.e., the principal is breaking the law with special needs children, stole money, has skeletons in his/her closet, the person making the charge is not in the school, didnt see what happened, wasnt there...). Obviously, anyone who says that ALL facts must be brought in to the hearing to give motive and prove innocence is someone who must be tarred and feathered. That's me and the lawyers I work with, but  we do not care about this fluff and stuff, and all of that leads to a stronger case in court for any kind of appeal against the arbitrator.

For instance, on April 19, 2013, I walked by a hearing room with the door open, at 49-51 Chambers Street, and I heard NYSUT Attorney Maria Elena Gonzalez Lichten telling Arbitrator Stephen O'Beirne how "she" put my email on her blog, and...". You dont think that the Attorneys speak to arbitrators only about the cases they are doing before them, do you? Anyway, I am posting the stuff I have already placed on this blog about Maria Elena Gonzolez Lichten, wife of Stuart Lichten, to update Mr. O'Beirne on what I have written, see here, here, and here. Mr. O'Beirne is an excellent Arbitrator, in my opinion, and can see through this infantile approach to squashing opposition to the Plan ("terminate any DOE employee who has tenure and is brought to 3020-a") . By the way, Mrs. Lichten, when you said in your email that I lied, I am still waiting to hear about what, so that I may address whatever it is that I lied about? My email address is betsy.combier@gmail.com, as you know.

Now to the charging process and determination of probable cause. If you are handed your specifications with a cover letter that says "...Principal __________ has found probable cause on the charges preferred against you" tell your attorney to ask, on the record and to the arbitrator, how the principal can find probable cause against you, considering the fact that Education Law 3020-a states that the school board must go into Executive Session and vote on whether there is probable cause, bring in Appendix A, usually served with the specifications - if you dont get this document, print out Education Law 3020-a and bring in those pages. (New York State Education Law 3020-a(2)(a)). New York City is part of New York State, and as far as I know, no agreement which conflicts with the law is valid.

The April 15, 2010 so-called 'agreement' signed by Joel Klein and Mike Mulgrew cannot be legally binding because Joel Klein signed the 'agreement' as chancellor, and he was never legally chancellor because he never had a contract, required by Education Law Section 2590-h. I wrote the "Who Are You Kidding Award Goes To Joel Klein" in 2007, but Mike Bloomberg never gave out any contracts to Klein, Black or Walcott. On January 7, 2013, Arbitrator Roy Watanabe asked DOE Attorney Lisa McFadden if Walcott had a contract. She said yes, and brought into the 3020-a hearing the waiver given to Walcott by New York State Commissioner David Steiner, giving Walcott permission to be chancellor:

Waiver from Steiner To Dennis Walcott

I am not a lawyer, but I believe that as Mr. Walcott did not sign this document, there is no term of office, and for many other reasons, this is not a contract, howevermuch the Gotcha Squad says it is. Compare with the contracts of Harold Levy and Rudy Crew in my 2007 article "The Who Are You Kidding Award Goes To Joel Klein"

I noticed what they were doing eight years ago. For 5 years I remained a silent observer, writing notes on everyone from a corner by the wall as a member of the public. Then someone at the DOE made up that I taped during a hearing, and this was completely false, but I became the omen of doom when the Attorneys realized that I knew what the fraud was. NYSUT Attorney Shawn T. Kelly, for example, on May 25, 2011 while everyone at 49-51 Chambers Street was on the sidewalk due to a firedrill, screamed "Dont talk with Betsy Combier, you will be terminated..." and other nonsense.

Then there are the screamers and naysayers from the DOE, Ian Nikol, Nancy Ryan, Dennis Da Costa, and Mallory Sullivan, all Department Attorneys who would rather scream  at me and try to get me run over by a bus than address the fact that they are harming innocent people without just or probable cause.

EDUCATION LAW §3020-A MANDATES A VOTE ON SPECIFICITY BY A SCHOOL BOARD

Education Law requires a vote by the school board precede a determination of “probable cause” upon which to bring charges against teachers removed from their schools. (Education Law §3020-a, Article 61) This provides all pedagogues protection from vindictive Principals who may want to remove senior teachers from their positions because they make salaries that could pay for two teachers instead of one.

NYS Education Law §2590-g does not address the issue of review and scrutiny of whether there is probable cause to proceed with the prosecution of disciplinary charges against tenured educational personnel. The requirements of NYS Education Law §3020-a and §3020-a (2)(a) , under which tenured personnel may be disciplined for “Just Cause”, are absolute and require that before charges can be brought against a tenured educator, the School Board must:

a. Determine that there is “probable cause” for the proceeding with charges by a majority vote by the Board.
b. Make this determination within 5 days of the charges being filed with the Board.
c. Ensure that the decision to proceed with the charges is not frivolous, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.

Without a school board to perform these functions – and, the New York City Panel For Educational Policy (“PEP”) never has taken on this function – there is no oversight by anyone other than the tenured teacher’s Principal to initiate the disciplinary process and Local Superintendent to endorse the Principal’s request to prefer file charges against any educator a Principal chooses to remove from the school the Principal administers.

The lack of independent review and lack of oversight by anyone other than the tenured teacher’s Principal to initiate discipline is not consistent with Education Law §3020-a. This constitutes a de facto denial of equal protection of the §3020-a law, as all arbitrators who sit on the panel to hear 3020-a charges are not permitted by law, collective bargaining agreement, or any other contractual arrangement to make a decision on charges unless they have been voted on by the New York City Board of Education before a tenured teacher is given these charges, pursuant to Education Law §§ 2590-j, 3020, and 3020-a.

The relevant parts are as follows:
“Filing of charges. All charges against a person enjoying the benefits of tenure as provided in subdivision three of section one thousand one hundred two, and sections two thousand five hundred nine, two thousand five hundred seventy-three, twenty-five hundred ninety-j, three thousand twelve and three thousand fourteen of this chapter shall be in writing and filed with the clerk or secretary of the school district or employing board during the period between the actual opening and closing of the school year for which the employed is normally required.”

Section 3020a(2)(a) of The NY Education Law states:

“Disposition of charges. Upon receipt of the charges, the clerk or secretary of the school district or employing board shall immediately notify said board thereof. Within five days after receipt of charges, the employing board, in executive session, shall determine, by a vote of a majority of all the members of such board, whether probable cause exists to bring a disciplinary proceeding against an employee pursuant to this section. If such determination is affirmative, a written statement specifying the charges in detail, the maximum penalty which will be imposed by the board if the employee does not request a hearing or that will be sought by the board if the employee is found guilty of the charges after a hearing and outlining the employee’s rights under this section, shall be immediately forwarded to the accused employee by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested or by personal delivery to the employee.”

Furthermore, Section 2590(j)(7)(b) of The NY Education Law specifically states:

“Charges may be initiated by the community superintendent against any such employee.” There is no mention of a principal finding probable cause. Certainly it is unreasonable to believe that due process exists when a principal charges a teacher without any accountability to anyone for that decision, and then finds probable cause for charging the teacher. Therefore the Just Cause Standard is not reached, and no hearing can proceed.

Before a tenured teacher can be brought up on disciplinary charges, the Education Law lays out a number of procedural hurdles that a Board of Education must comply with. These procedural hurdles are in place to protect the rights of the tenured teacher to fair process, and constitute jurisdictional pre-requisites to a §3020-a disciplinary hearing. Chief among these procedural hurdles is the requirement that probable cause to prefer charges must be voted on by the Board of Education (see, e.g., Education Law §3020-a(2)(a)).

Compliance with this provision is a jurisdictional condition precedent to a §3020-a disciplinary hearing. Without it, the hearing cannot go forward. Prohibition is the appropriate procedural remedy for the assertion of a claim where prohibition is available “to prevent a body or officer from proceeding or threatening to proceed without or in excess of its jurisdiction.” See: Matter of Schumer v Holtzman, 60 N.Y. 2d 46, 51; Garzilli v Mills, 250 A.D.2d 131 (3d Dep’t 1998); Community School Board No. 29, SED No. 3562 (Howard Edelman, a member of the UFT-DOE arbitration panel in New York City -Dec. 14, 1998).

In New York City, §3020-a teacher disciplinary proceedings have become penal in nature and not arbitral in the same manner labor grievances are resolved. Matter of Clayton v Bd. of Educ., 49 A.D.2d 343 (3rd Dept 1975). Submission to these disciplinary hearings are compulsory and the jurisdiction of the hearing officer is derived from statute. Teachers are charged, similar to an indictment in the criminal world, upon determination of probable cause.

When I started examining the procedures used by the newly instituted Department of Education, I saw that my knowledge of education law and arbitration, which I got by reading my own books (I am not an attorney) did not give me any clue as to the random and arbitrary nature of the 3020-a hearings I was asked to attend in NYC. So, I studied the lawyers and the arbitrators to try to find out how the law could be ignored. Then the Gotcha Squad realized that I was on to something, and took it upon themselves to attack me.

So now I can write about the lawyers who decided to attack, and will provide my website with the names of the Attorneys who threw aside the lives, careers, health benefits and tenured positions of teachers in order to make a profit.

NY Appellate Bench Rips Cardozo in Law Journal Letter

LINK
In a stunning rebuke to NYC’s top lawyer, Michael Cardozo, 18 of the 20 justices that sit in the Appellate Division, First Department have taken him to the woodshed with a letter in the New York Law Journal coming out tomorrow (12/17/09). The response comes due to Cardozo’s attack on the state’s judiciary last week. Cardozo is now starting his third term as the city’s Corporation Counsel.
The appellate court judges are responding to Cardozo’s December 7th column on improving efficiency in the courts, a subject I wrote about a few days ago when both bench and bar came down on him hard in NYC’s Top Lawyer Gets Reamed For Inefficiency (By Both Bench and Bar).
But now it is not simply one panel of judges ripping the city for its own inefficiency, or lawyers writing letters to the paper. Now the vast majority of the appellate bench that hears NYC cases has called Carozo’s “imperious outpouring of advice” “insulting.” They went on to write, led by Presiding Justice Luis Gonzalez (pictured), that:

“We feel compelled to respond to his misguided assertions, his misplaced blame and his attacks on the state trial judges…”

The First Department hears cases from the Manhattan and Bronx courts. And the Second Department, which sanctioned the city just last week in Byam v. City of New York for a decade of delay in providing discovery, handles Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island (as well as other downstate counties).
You could almost see the smoke pouring off the keyboards of the judges as they wrote of Cardozo regarding changes in the use of 60-day reports that judges make to track cases:

In large measure, his facile proposals amount to an echo of reforms that are under way or have already been adopted by our former and current chief judges… Every one of these items has already been implemented by the Office of Court Administration, which on a constant basis compiles and circulates large amounts of information regarding judges’ job performance.

The idea that current reports are being inaccurate implied, to the court, that some dishonesty was going on. The letter stated:

The idea that complaints must be filed with the Judicial Conduct Commission in order to ensure accuracy in 60-day reporting requirements baselessly implies that there is actually a problem with inaccuracy, an implication for which Mr. Cardozo provides no support.

After defending the trial judges against Cardozo’s charges, the appellate judges lowered the hammer on him, placing the blame for much delay and inefficiency squarely at his feet (just as this letter Helene Blank and Marc Dittenhoefer did the other day):

In fact, it is ironic that the Corporation Counsel blames the courts for a failure to deal appropriately with litigation delays, since it is the office of Corporation Counsel of the City of New York that plays a significant role in causing those undue delays. For one thing, there is always a backlog of ready city cases in the dedicated city parts, and, with each part being assigned only two city attorneys, neither plaintiffs’ attorneys nor the trial judges have the means to ensure that ready cases can proceed immediately to trial; the city alone wields that authority. A vast amount of inefficiency impeding the resolution of litigation is also created by the city’s oft-demonstrated cavalier attitude toward its discovery obligations. The city’s almost routine failure to timely and fully cooperate with its discovery obligations, even in the face of repeated court orders, is regularly confronted by city part judges attempting to solve the city’s intransigence (see e.g., Lewis v. City of New York, 17 Misc. 3d 559 [2007]).

What followed then was a litany of First Department cases in which the sanction of attorneys fees was imposed on the city as a result of its “inexcusably lax” responses to discovery orders.
And then a concession about city cases that all the personal injury attorneys in this town already knew, but had always been simply implied by the courts:

[A]s a rule, our courts give far more leeway to the city than we typically do to other defendants in civil actions.

Cardozo isn’t having a very good holiday season. In fact, having so many judges angry at him, I’m thinking this will be his last holiday season in his office.
It’s worth noting, however, that in an interview with the Law Journal that accompanied the letter (can’t find link), Justice Gonzalez said the First Department’s “track record of evenhandedness in our treatment of Mr. Cardozo’s client, New York City,” would continue despite the judges’ criticism. He went on to say, “The bottom line is our judges are always mindful of our ethical responsibilities and our members have always dealt with Mr. Cardozo’s client in a fair and even-handed manner and we will continue to do so.”
The Corporation Counsel has 650 attorneys working for it, and handles a wide range of legal issues on behalf of the city. Background here on Cardozo as he prepared to start his third term. 

Teacher Tenure Hearings = Part 82 of the Commissioner's Regulations

Law and Regulations

• Part 82 of the Commissioner's Regulations

Education Law §3020-a. Disciplinary procedures and penalties.

1. Filing of charges.

All charges against a person enjoying the benefits of tenure as provided in subdivision three of section eleven hundred two, and sections twenty-five hundred nine, twenty-five hundred seventy-three, twenty-five hundred ninety-j, three thousand twelve and three thousand fourteen of this chapter shall be in writing and filed with the clerk or secretary of the school district or employing board during the period between the actual opening and closing of the school year for which the employed is normally required to serve. Except as provided in subdivision eight of section twenty-five hundred seventy-three and subdivision seven of section twenty-five hundred ninety-j of this chapter, no charges under this section shall be brought more than three years after the occurrence of the alleged incompetency or misconduct, except when the charge is of misconduct constituting a crime when committed.

2. Disposition of charges.

a. Upon receipt of the charges, the clerk or secretary of the school district or employing board shall immediately notify said board thereof. Within five days after receipt of charges, the employing board, in executive session, shall determine, by a vote of a majority of all the members of such board, whether probable cause exists to bring a disciplinary proceeding against an employee pursuant to this section. If such determination is affirmative, a written statement specifying (i) the charges in detail, (ii) the maximum penalty which will be imposed by the board if the employee does not request a hearing or that will be sought by the board if the employee is found guilty of the charges after a hearing and (iii) the employee's rights under this section, shall be immediately forwarded to the accused employee by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested or by personal delivery to the employee.

b. The employee may be suspended pending a hearing on the charges and the final determination thereof. The suspension shall be with pay, except the employee may be suspended without pay if the employee has entered a guilty plea to or has been convicted of a felony crime concerning the criminal sale or possession of a controlled substance, a precursor of a controlled substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of the penal law; or a felony crime involving the physical abuse of a minor or student. The employee shall be terminated without a hearing, as provided for in this  section, upon conviction of a sex offense, as defined in subparagraph two of paragraph b of subdivision seven-a of section three hundred five of this chapter. To the extent this section applies to an employee acting as a school administrator or supervisor, as defined in subparagraph three of paragraph b of subdivision seven-b of section three hundred five of this chapter, such employee shall be terminated without a hearing, as provided for in this section, upon conviction of a felony offense defined in subparagraph two of paragraph b of subdivision seven-b of section three hundred five of this chapter.

c. Within ten days of receipt of the statement of charges, the employee shall notify the clerk or secretary of the employing board in writing whether he or she desires a hearing on the charges and when the charges concern pedagogical incompetence or issues involving pedagogical judgment, his or her choice of either a single hearing officer or a three member panel, provided that a three member panel shall not be available where the charges concern pedagogical incompetence based solely upon a teacher's or principal's pattern of ineffective teaching or performance as defined in section three thousand twelve-c of this article. All other charges shall be heard by a single hearing officer.

d. The unexcused failure of the employee to notify the clerk or secretary of his or her desire for a hearing within ten days of the receipt of charges shall be deemed a waiver of the right to a hearing. Where an employee requests a hearing in the manner provided for by this section, the clerk or secretary of the board shall, within three working days of receipt of the employee's notice or request for a hearing, notify the commissioner of the need for a hearing. If the employee waives his or her right to a hearing the employing board shall proceed, within fifteen days, by a vote of a majority of all members of such board, to determine the case and fix the penalty, if any, to be imposed in accordance with subdivision four of this section.

3. Hearings.

a. Notice of hearing. Upon receipt of a request for a hearing in accordance with subdivision two of this section, the commissioner shall forthwith notify the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter "association") of the need for a hearing and shall request the association to provide to the commissioner forthwith a list of names of persons chosen by the association from the association's panel of labor arbitrators to potentially serve as hearing officers together with relevant biographical information on each arbitrator. Upon receipt of said list and biographical information, the commissioner shall forthwith send a copy of both simultaneously to the employing board and the employee. The commissioner shall also simultaneously notify both the employing board and the employee of each potential hearing officer's record in the last five cases of commencing and completing hearings within the time periods prescribed in this section.

b. (i) Hearing officers. All hearings pursuant to this section shall be conducted before and by a single hearing officer selected as provided for in this section. A hearing officer shall not be eligible to serve in such position if he or she is a resident of the school district, other than the city of New York, under the jurisdiction of the employing board, an employee, agent or representative of the employing board or of any labor organization representing employees of such employing board, has served as such agent or representative within two years of the date of the scheduled hearing, or if he or she is then serving as a mediator or fact finder in the same school district.

(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for hearings commenced by the filing of charges prior to April first, two thousand twelve, the hearing officer shall be compensated by the department with the customary fee paid for service as an arbitrator under the auspices of the association for each day of actual service plus necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of his or her duties. All other expenses of the disciplinary proceedings commenced by the filing of charges prior to April first, two thousand twelve shall be paid in accordance with rules promulgated by the commissioner. Claims for such compensation for days of actual service and reimbursement for necessary travel and other expenses for hearings commenced by the filing of charges prior to April first, two thousand twelve shall be paid from an appropriation for such purpose in the order in which they have been approved by the commissioner for payment, provided payment shall first be made for any other hearing costs payable by the commissioner, including the costs of transcribing the record, and provided further that no such claim shall be set aside for insufficiency of funds to make a complete payment, but shall be eligible for a partial payment in one year and shall retain its priority date status for appropriations designated for such purpose in future years.

(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, rule or regulation to the contrary, for hearings commenced by the filing of charges on or after April first, two thousand twelve, the hearing officer shall be compensated by the department for each day of actual service plus necessary  travel  and other reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of his or her duties, provided that the commissioner shall establish a schedule for maximum rates of compensation of hearing officers based on customary and reasonable fees for service as an arbitrator and provide for limitations on the number of study hours that may be claimed.

(ii) The commissioner shall mail to the employing board and the employee the list of potential hearing officers and biographies provided to the commissioner by the association, the employing board and the employee, individually or through their agents or representatives, shall by mutual agreement select a hearing officer from said list to conduct the hearing and shall notify the commissioner of their selection.

(iii) Within fifteen days after receiving the list of potential hearing officers as described in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, the employing board and the employee shall each notify the commissioner of their agreed upon hearing officer selection. If the employing board and the employee fail to agree on an arbitrator to serve as a hearing officer from the list of potential hearing officers, or fail to notify the commissioner of a selection within such fifteen day time period, the commissioner shall appoint a hearing officer from the list. The provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply in cities with a population of one million or more with alternative procedures specified in section three thousand twenty of this article.

(iv) In those cases in which the employee elects to have the charges heard by a hearing panel, the hearing panel shall consist of the hearing officer, selected in accordance with this subdivision,  and  two additional persons, one selected by the employee and one selected by the employing board, from a list maintained for such purpose by the commissioner. The list shall be composed of professional personnel with administrative or supervisory responsibility, professional personnel without administrative or supervisory responsibility, chief school administrators, members of employing boards and others selected from lists of nominees submitted to  the  commissioner  by  statewide organizations  representing  teachers,  school  administrators  and supervisors and the employing boards. Hearing panel members other than the hearing officer shall be compensated by the department at the rate of one hundred dollars for each day of actual service plus necessary travel  and  subsistence  expenses. The hearing officer shall be compensated as set forth in this subdivision. The hearing officer shall be the chairperson of the hearing panel.

c. Hearing procedures. (i) (A) The commissioner shall have the power to establish necessary rules and procedures for the conduct of hearings under this section.

(B) The department shall be authorized to monitor and investigate a hearing officer's compliance with statutory timelines pursuant to this section. The commissioner shall annually inform all hearing officers who have heard cases pursuant to this section during the preceding year that the time periods prescribed in this section for conducting such hearings are to be strictly followed. A record of continued failure to commence and complete hearings within the time periods prescribed in this section shall be considered grounds for the commissioner to exclude such individual from the list of potential hearing officers sent to the employing board and the employee for such hearings.

(C) Such rules shall not require compliance with technical rules of evidence. Hearings shall be conducted by the hearing officer selected pursuant to paragraph b of this subdivision with full and fair disclosure of the nature of the case and evidence against the employee by the employing board and shall be public or private at the discretion of the employee. The employee shall have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself or herself and an opportunity to testify in his or her own behalf. The employee shall not be required to testify. Each party shall have the right to be represented by counsel, to subpoena witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses. All testimony taken shall be under oath which the hearing officer is hereby authorized to administer.

(D) An accurate record of the proceedings shall be kept at the expense of the department at each such hearing in accordance with the regulations of the commissioner. A copy of the record of the hearings shall, upon request, be furnished without charge to the employee and the board of education involved. The department shall be authorized to utilize any new technology or such other appropriate means to transcribe or record such hearings in an accurate, reliable, efficient and cost-effective manner without any charge to the employee or board of education involved.

(i-a)(A) Where charges of incompetence are brought based solely upon a pattern of ineffective teaching or performance of a classroom teacher or principal, as defined in section three thousand twelve-c of this article, the hearing shall be conducted before and by a single hearing officer in an expedited hearing, which shall commence within seven days after the pre-hearing conference and shall be completed within sixty days after the pre-hearing conference. The hearing officer shall establish a hearing schedule at the pre-hearing conference to ensure that the expedited hearing is completed within the required timeframes and to ensure an equitable distribution of days between the employing board and the charged employee. Notwithstanding any other law, rule or regulation to the contrary, no adjournments may be granted that would extend the hearing beyond such sixty days, except as authorized in this subparagraph. A hearing officer, upon request, may grant a limited and time specific adjournment that would extend the hearing beyond such sixty days if the hearing officer determines that the delay is attributable to a circumstance or occurrence substantially beyond the control of the requesting party and an injustice would result if the adjournment were not granted.

(B) Such charges shall allege that the employing board has developed and substantially implemented a teacher or principal improvement plan in accordance with subdivision four of section three thousand twelve-c of this article for the employee following the first evaluation in which the employee was rated ineffective, and the immediately preceding evaluation if the employee was rated developing. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a pattern of ineffective teaching or performance as defined in section three thousand twelve-c of this article shall constitute very significant evidence of incompetence for purposes of this section. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to limit the defenses which the employee may place before the hearing officer in challenging the allegation of a  pattern  of ineffective teaching or performance.

(C) The commissioner shall annually inform all hearing officers who have heard cases pursuant to this section during the preceding year that the time periods prescribed in this subparagraph for  conducting expedited hearings are to be strictly followed. A record of continued failure to commence and complete expedited hearings within the time periods prescribed in this subparagraph shall be considered grounds for the commissioner to exclude such individual from the list of potential hearing officers sent to the employing board and the employee for such expedited hearings.

(ii) The hearing officer selected to conduct a hearing under this section shall, within ten to fifteen days of agreeing to serve in such position, hold a pre-hearing conference which shall be held in the school district or county seat of the county, or any county, wherein the employing school board is located. The pre-hearing conference shall be limited in length to one day except that the hearing officer, in his or her discretion, may allow one additional day for good cause shown.

(iii) At the pre-hearing conference the hearing officer shall have the power to:

(A) issue subpoenas;

(B) hear and decide all motions, including but not limited to motions to dismiss the charges;

(C) hear and decide all applications for bills of particular or requests for production of materials or information, including, but not limited to, any witness statement (or statements),  investigatory statement (or statements) or note (notes), exculpatory evidence or any other evidence, including district or student records, relevant and material to the employee's defense.

(iv) Any pre-hearing motion or application relative to the sufficiency of the charges, application or amendment thereof, or any preliminary matters shall be made upon written notice to the hearing officer and the adverse party no less than five days prior to the date of the pre-hearing conference. Any pre-hearing motions or applications not made as provided for herein shall be deemed waived except for good cause as determined by the hearing officer.

(v) In the event that at the pre-hearing conference the employing board presents evidence that the professional license of the employee has been revoked and all judicial and administrative remedies have been exhausted or foreclosed, the hearing officer shall schedule the date, time and place for an expedited hearing, which hearing shall commence not more than seven days after the pre-hearing conference and which shall be limited to one day. The expedited hearing shall be held in the local school district or county seat of the county or any county, wherein the said employing board is located. The expedited hearing shall not be postponed except upon the request of a party and then only for good cause as determined by the hearing officer. At such hearing, each party shall have equal time in which to present its case.

(vi) During the pre-hearing conference, the hearing officer shall determine the reasonable amount of time necessary for a final hearing on the charge or charges and shall schedule the location, time(s) and date(s) for the final hearing. The final hearing shall be held in the local school district or county seat of the county, or any county, wherein the said employing school board is located. In the event that the hearing officer determines that the nature of the case requires the final hearing to last more than one day, the days that are scheduled for the final hearing shall be consecutive. The day or days scheduled for the final hearing shall not be postponed except upon the request of a party and then only for good cause shown as determined by the hearing officer. In all cases, the final hearing shall be completed no later than sixty days after the pre-hearing conference unless the hearing officer determines that extraordinary circumstances warrant a limited extension.

(vii) All evidence shall be submitted by all parties within one hundred twenty-five days of the filing of charges and no additional evidence shall be accepted after such time, absent extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the parties.

d. Limitation on claims. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, rule or regulation to the contrary, no payments shall be made by the department pursuant to this subdivision on or after April first, two thousand twelve for:

(i) compensation of a hearing officer or hearing panel member, (ii) reimbursement of such hearing officers or panel members for necessary travel or other expenses incurred by them, or (iii) for other hearing expenses on a claim submitted later than one year after the final disposition of the hearing by any means, including settlement, or within ninety days after the effective date of this paragraph, whichever is later; provided that no payment shall be barred or reduced where such payment is required as a result of a court order or judgment or a final audit.

4. Post hearing procedures.

a. The hearing officer shall render a written decision within thirty days of the last day of the final hearing, or in the case of an expedited hearing within ten days of such expedited hearing, and shall forward a copy thereof to the commissioner who shall immediately forward copies of the decision to the employee and to the clerk or secretary of the employing board. The written decision shall include the hearing officer's findings of fact on each charge, his or her conclusions with regard to each charge based on said findings and shall state what penalty or other action, if any, shall be taken by the employing board. At the request of the employee, in determining what, if any, penalty or other action shall be imposed, the hearing officer shall consider the extent to which the employing board made efforts towards correcting the behavior of the employee which resulted in charges being brought under this section through means including but not limited to: remediation, peer intervention or an employee assistance plan. In those cases where a penalty is imposed, such penalty may be a written reprimand, a fine, suspension for a fixed time without pay, or dismissal. In addition to or in lieu of the aforementioned penalties, the hearing officer, where he or she deems appropriate, may impose upon the employee remedial action including but not limited to leaves of absence with or without pay, continuing education and/or study, a requirement that the employee seek counseling or medical treatment or that the employee engage in any other remedial or combination of remedial actions.

b. Within fifteen days of receipt of the hearing officer's decision the employing board shall implement the decision. If the employee is acquitted he or she shall be restored to his or her position with full pay for any period of suspension without pay and the charges expunged from the employment record. If an employee who was convicted of a felony crime specified in paragraph b of subdivision two of this section, has said conviction reversed, the employee, upon application, shall be entitled to have his or her pay and other emoluments restored, for the period from the date of his or her suspension to the date of the decision.

c. The hearing officer shall indicate in the decision whether any of the charges brought by the employing board were frivolous as defined in section eighty-three hundred three-a of the civil practice law and rules. If the hearing officer finds that all of the charges brought against the employee were frivolous, the hearing officer shall order the employing board to reimburse the department the reasonable costs said department incurred as a result of the proceeding and to reimburse the employee the reasonable costs, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys' fees, the employee incurred in defending the charges. If the hearing officer finds that some but not all of the charges brought against the employee were frivolous, the hearing officer shall order the employing board to reimburse the department a portion, in the discretion of the hearing officer, of the reasonable costs said department incurred as a result of the proceeding and to reimburse the employee a portion, in the discretion of the hearing officer, of the reasonable costs, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys' fees, the employee incurred in defending the charges.

5. Appeal.

a. Not later than ten days after receipt of the hearing officer's decision, the employee or the employing board may make an application to the New York state supreme court to vacate or modify the decision of the hearing officer pursuant to section seventy-five hundred eleven of the civil practice law and rules. The court's review shall be limited to the grounds set forth in such section. The hearing panel's determination shall be deemed to be final for the purpose of such proceeding.

b. In no case shall the filing or the pendency of an appeal delay the implementation of the decision of the hearing officer.

Last Updated: June 19, 2012

3020-a and Student Scores: Use Wisely, Every Case is Unique

Incompetency Hearings and Education Law 3012-c

In 3020-a hearings, rarely do the Representatives/Attorneys for the Respondent (teacher/educator) bring up Education Law 3012-c.

When I do an incompetency case, I bring it up when I know that my client has terrific student data. Why? Because if an educator is alleged to be totally a failure at teaching, and his/her students have high scores on tests, grades, etc., I believe that the educator cannot be proven to be a failure at teaching. The data is one more item added to the list as part of the defense.

If an educator does not have good scores on tests, then this data is not brought in because there are too many intervening factors to have this data prove that the person is truly incompetent. Thus if the Respondent teacher is appointed to a CTT class or self-contained class, the student data does not reflect the progress or learning of the students, necessarily, as these students may not have been given their services, extended time, and other accommodations.

The data should never be used alone, of course. This is part of an entire defense, planned and implemented by the legal team. Added to the mix are: hostile work environment, hatred/revenge/wrongdoing by the administrators or other people in the building, lies and misinformation. Winning a 3020-a is both time-consuming and work intensive, but worth every minute. The DOE Attorneys have a very heavy burden most of the time. They get half the story - most of which may not be true - and have to argue for termination or resignation, not something in between. How does a late student assessment prove incompetency? How does a lesson plan that does not have a formula in it prove that a teacher cannot teach math? I don't know.

The DOE attorneys argue that the student data is not "relevant". This is also the ruling of one of the most biased against teachers, Arbitrator Haydee Rosario who, in

Haydee Rosario, Esq.

2006, was an attorney for the NYC DOE and prosecuted educators brought to 3020-a.She believes that all student data for a teacher charged with incompetency is not relevant to the charges. Ridiculous. If students have great standardized test scores, certainly a part of the result is due to the teaching that went on in that class that year. At least that's what I think.

In fact teacher data reports include the vague "student progress" in test scores, ruled by New York State Supreme Court Judge Cynthia Kern, with teacher's names. Now THAT's unfair. Scores and student data are part of a package of facts, and should not be used without all the other elements of bad faith in public policy, the improper determination of probable cause, hostility by a person in the building, grievances filed by the Respondent, facts which can bring charges against an employee and which do not prove by a preponderance of evidence that the teacher is incompetent..

Betsy Combier

N.Y. Education Law 3012-c – Annual professional performance review of classroom teachers and building principals

Current as of: 2013 | Check for updates | Other versions

LINK

§ 3012-c. Annual professional performance review of classroom teachers and building principals. 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the annual professional performance reviews of all classroom teachers and building principals employed by school districts or boards of cooperative educational services shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section. Such performance reviews which are conducted on or after July first, two thousand eleven, or on or after the date specified in paragraph c of subdivision two of this section where applicable, shall include measures of student achievement and be conducted in accordance with this section. Such annual professional performance reviews shall be a significant factor for employment decisions including but not limited to, promotion, retention, tenure determination, termination, and supplemental compensation, which decisions are to be made in accordance with locally developed procedures negotiated pursuant to the requirements of article fourteen of the civil service law where applicable. Provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the statutory right of a school district or board of cooperative educational services to terminate a probationary teacher or principal for statutorily and constitutionally permissible reasons other than the performance of the teacher or principal in the classroom or school, including but not limited to misconduct. Such performance reviews shall also be a significant factor in teacher and principal development, including but not limited to, coaching, induction support and differentiated professional development, which are to be locally established in accordance with procedures negotiated pursuant to the requirements of article fourteen of the civil service law.

2. a. (1) The annual professional performance reviews conducted pursuant to this section for classroom teachers and building principals shall differentiate teacher and principal effectiveness using the following quality rating categories: highly effective, effective, developing and ineffective, with explicit minimum and maximum scoring ranges for each category, for the state assessments and other comparable measures subcomponent of the evaluation and for the locally selected measures of student achievement subcomponent of the evaluation, as prescribed in the regulations of the commissioner. There shall be: (i) a state assessments and other comparable measures subcomponent which shall comprise twenty or twenty-five percent of the evaluation; (ii) a locally selected measures of student achievement subcomponent which shall comprise twenty or fifteen percent of the evaluation; and (iii) an other measures of teacher or principal effectiveness subcomponent which shall comprise the remaining sixty percent of the evaluation, which in sum shall constitute the composite teacher or principal effectiveness score. Such annual professional performance reviews shall result in a single composite teacher or principal effectiveness score, which incorporates multiple measures of effectiveness related to the criteria included in the regulations of the commissioner.

(2) For annual professional performance reviews conducted in accordance with paragraph b of this subdivision for the two thousand eleven–two thousand twelve school year and for annual professional performance reviews conducted in accordance with paragraphs f and g of this subdivision for the two thousand twelve–two thousand thirteen school year, the overall composite scoring ranges shall be in accordance with this subparagraph. A classroom teacher and building principal shall be deemed to be:

(A) Highly Effective if they achieve a composite effectiveness score of 91-100